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1. Courts recognize a cause of action for wrongful civil proceedings or malicious pros-
ecution if the wrongful proceeding has a "quasi-criminal" character or if it substantially
interferes with a person's liberty or damages a person's reputation, such as in insanity, con-
tempt, paternity, or juvenile delinquency proceedings. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 851-52 (4th ed. 1971). [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. See also W. PROSSER,
J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1098 n.l (6th ed. 1976) [here-
inafter cited as PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ]; Note, Malicious Prosecution as Basis of Re-
coveryfor Wrongful Instigation of Civil Commitment Proceedings, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
115 (1972). In addition, all jurisdictions allow a civil action for malicious prosecution if the
plaintiff has been wrongfully arrested or if his property interests have been interfered with,
such as in wrongful attachment or involuntary bankruptcy proceedings. PROSSER, supra, at
851-52. In the absence of special circumstances similar to the ones just mentioned, a sub-
stantial minority of jurisdictions adhere to the "English rule," which refuses to allow an
action based upon a groundless civil suit. Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1380 (N.D.
Iowa 1978); Garcia v. Wall & Ochs, Inc., 256 Pa. Super. 74, 74, 389 A.2d 607, 608, 610
(1978); PROSSER, supra, at 850-53; PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ, supra, at 1098 n.2; Note,
Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: .4 HistoricalAnalysis, 88 YALE
L.J. 1218, 1219-21 (1979).
Arguments in favor of the English rule against an action for malicious prosecution in
the absence of special damages include: (1) the successful defendant is fully compensated by
the award of costs (which is largely true in England because attorneys' fees are considered
part of costs); (2) the cause of action may deter parties from asserting honest claims because
of a fear of retaliatory litigation; and (3) allowing such action may perpetuate litigation.
PROSSER, supra, at 851; Peerson v. Ashcraft Cotton Mills, 201 Ala. 348, 78 So. 204 (1917).
Commentators have disputed these arguments by observing that American jurisdictions do
not usually allow attorneys fees as part of recoverable costs. It is inappropriate to follow the
English rule on malicious prosecution ifthe jurisdiction does not follow the English rule on
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imposed on the plaintiff who misuses court processes by asserting mali-
cious or abusive claims having no credible basis in fact, law, or equity.
The plaintiffs lawyer is also legally liable if he willfully participates in
presenting what is known to be a false and malicious claim.2 Similarly,
the rules of professional conduct prohibit the plaintiff's lawyer from
asserting unwarranted claims or from taking any action that serves
merely to harass or to injure another party.3
Civil liability for monetary damages and professional restrictions
thus limit what may properly be asserted in a court of law on the plain-
tiff's side of the adversarial ledger. The law distinguishes the vigorous
from the malicious to allow an innocent defendant compensation for
the expense and burden of baseless and malicious litigation.4 The dis-
tinction also serves to protect the court system from time-consuming
and expensive misuse of its processes 5 and seeks to maintain the integ-
rity of the judicial system by discouraging the use of the courts to per-
petrate a wrong.6
attorneys' fees. In addition, it has been argued that the fear of deterring honest litigation or
of perpetuating litigation has not been borne out by the experience of jurisdictions which
recognize the actions generally. See PROSSER, supra, at 85 1. According to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, a growing majority of jurisdictions recognize malicious prosecution with-
out the requirement of special injury. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674, at 438
(1977) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
Most American jurisdictions also recognize the tort of abuse of process. See RESTATE-
MENT, supra, § 682; PROSSER, supra, § 121.
2. See, e.g., Munson v. Linnick, 255 Cal. App. 2d 589, 63 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1967); First
Nat'l Bank of Mayfield v. Gardner, 376 S.W.2d 311 (Ky. 1964); Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224
Minn. 224, 38 N.W.2d 780 (1949).
3. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1979); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.1-3.3 (1983).
4. See Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 50-51, 529 P.2d 608, 615, 118
Cal. Rptr. 184, 190 (1975):
The individual is harmed because he is compelled to defend against a fabricated
claim which not only subjects him to the panoply of psychological pressures most
civil defendants suffer, but also to the additional stress of attempting to resist a suit
commenced out of spite or ill will, often magnified by slanderous allegations in the
pleadings.
See also Norton v. Hines, 42 Cal. App. 3d 917, 922, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 240 (1975).
5. See Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d at 51, 529 P.2d at 614, 118 Cal. Rptr.
at 190 (quoting Teesdale v. Liebschwager, 42 S.D. 323, 325, 174 N.W. 620, 621 (1919)):
"The judicial process is adversely affected by a maliciously persecuted cause not only by the
clogging of already crowded dockets, but by the unscrupulous use of the courts by individu-
als '.. . as instruments with which to maliciously injure their fellow men.'"
6. The judicial integrity policy is reflected in Justice Frankfurter's statement in United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting): "[I]s
there any principle which is more familiar or more firmly embedded in the history of Anglo-
American Law than the basic doctrine that the courts will not permit themselves to be used
as instruments of inequity and injustice?"
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Although the bar imposes professional restraints on how lawyers
may handle the defense of a civil action,7 tort law does not impose civil
liability on defendants or their lawyers for the malicious assertion of
false and baseless defenses. The torts of malicious prosecution and
abuse of process are well known. The corresponding tort of malicious
defense is unfamiliar, if known at all.
This one-sided development of the law is anomalous. It is well
known that defendants, with disturbing frequency, find that it serves
their financial advantage or collateral personal motives to deny claims
they know are valid and justified.8 Defendants are no more able to
resist the temptations of excess advocacy than plaintiffs. Yet few courts
have considered the application of malicious prosecution principles to
the bad faith defense of a civil action. In effect the law, while con-
demning malicious conduct by plaintiffs, tolerates defendant
misconduct.
In the absence of an effective remedy to compensate plaintiffs for
injuries resulting from defendants' bad faith defensive tactics, a de-
fendant can deny a valid claim from the pleading stage through the
appeal with no fear of serious repercussions. Presently, the worst conse-
quence imposed on such a defendant is to require him to pay the
amount owed in the first place.9 In the interim, the defendant has the
7. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A) (1), (2) (1979);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.1-3.3 (1983).
8. See Comment, Controlling the Malicious Defendant, 2 STAN. L. REV. 184, 185-87
(1949); see also Potts v. Imlay, 4 N.J.L. 382, 385 (1816):
Besides, if we go to the very equity of the thing, which seems to be the ground of
argument here taken, the same reasoning which is here used to prove that the de-
fendant ought to have damages upon a false claim, would also prove that the plain-
tiff ought to have damages upon a false plea. He is put to all the expense of a trial
upon such a plea, and yet he can recover nothing therefor but his lawful costs;
though surely all experience teaches us that the plea of the defendant is not less
frequently false than the claim of the plaintiff.
9. The defendant may have to absorb the expense of his attorneys' fees, but the sting
of this possibility is diminished by two factors. First, if the defendant is holding the money,
it may be invested pending the outcome of the litigation. $10,000 in a savings certificate at
10% will yield more than $6,000 over five years. $50,000 invested at 10% will yield more
than $31,000 over five years. These amounts may be enough to cover the cost of defense
with a margin of profit, and it may be a motive in prosecuting a frivolous appeal. See
Hersch v. Citizens Say. & Loan Ass'n, 146 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 194 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1983) in
which the court assessed $125,000 in damages for the prosecution of a frivolous appeal,
stating:
Defendants' motive in this case is as easy to understand as it is difficult to hide.
For nearly five years defendants have had the use of approximately $1 million
legally owed by them to plaintiffs. It is common knowledge that a conservative
investment during this same period would have earned annual interest greatly in
excess of the 7 percent, and later 10 percent, payable upon civil judgments. In this
July 1984] LIMITS OF ADVOCACY
use of the disputed funds.
The need to litigate baseless defenses unduly burdens the plaintiff.
If the plaintiff lacks resources, the money withheld could mean the dif-
ference between financial survival and disaster. In such circumstances,
the defendant can often use the threat of extended litigation to force an
unfair settlement. Moreover, a plaintiff who prosecutes a case to its
finish will have additional unrecoverable expenses, such as attorneys'
fees.
The absence of a remedy for malicious defense affects more than
the immediate parties to a lawsuit. Failure to proscribe such conduct
encourages dishonesty and allows abuse and misuse of legal processes.
The delay that results from such conduct increases the burden on the
judicial system, which is already struggling to accommodate the adju-
dication of legitimate disputes. The burden is felt directly by those liti-
gants whose legitimate disputes take three to five years to reach trial.
Taxpayers are indirectly affected because they provide the principal fi-
nancial support for the courts.'0
type of market good investment counsel could not ignore the fact that postpone-
ment of payment of this judgment was a profitable venture. Given the legal educa-
tion and investment sophistication of defendants in this case, and their
indisposition ever to post the collateral called for in their agreement with plaintiffs,
we are compelled to the conclusion that material gain through delay was and is
their motive.
Id at 1012, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
Second, the defendant's litigation expenses may not be very significant until the time for
final preparation for trial. Thus, if the chief purpose of the delay is to coerce a favorable
settlement from the plaintiff, the relatively small attorneys' fees incurred during the four to
five year delay may be more than offset by the amount saved through a favorable settlement.
See Lundergan, Kelly, & Strauss, Lawyers Bemoan Court Congestion, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1982,
at 27:
If it's 99 percent sure that my client ought to pay $20,000 in damages but I have a
real technical defense," says [a Palo Alto, California] lawyer, "I can keep my client
from paying for two years. It will eventually cost him $20,000 plus 10 percent
interest (the standard legal rate of interest), whereas during that two years he didn't
have to pay 22 percent on borrowing $20,000. I've done my client a great service,
but I don't know that I've advanced the cause of justice. When I represent the
other side, it infuriates me that there is no incentive for settlement.
10. In a cost study of the Los Angeles Superior Courts for the fiscal year 1980-1981, the
following amounts were determined to represent the cost of maintaining a courtroom for a
single day: civil-$898, family law-$1,294, probate-2,979, juvenile-3,332, and crimi-
nal-$3,791. Los ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT, SUPERIOR COURT COST STUDY FISCAL
YEAR 1980-81 (1982). The latter three types of litigation are more expensive from the public
standpoint because the cost of legal counsel and additional court personnel are figured in.
Even the more modest civil courtroom figure is wasteful, however, if court time is devoted to
frivolous disputes. What is ironic, moreover, is that the cost of maintaining the civil court-
rooms is borne, in significant part, by the middle class, many of whom would find the ex-
penses of litigation beyond their means. See infra note 27.
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A tort of malicious defense of a civil action would inhibit such bad
faith actions and consequently would serve to relieve courtroom con-
gestion. It is thus curious that majority jurisdictions, which recognize
malicious prosecution in the absence of special injury, refuse to recog-
nize the corresponding tort of malicious defense. The scant authority
on the issue is divided and usually in the form of dicta"I suggesting that
there may be historical reasons for resistance to such a tort. Such prac-
tices and attitudes, however, may be based on conditions that no longer
exist. Under current conditions, false and baseless defenses affect the
litigants and the court system no less than false and baseless suits and,
as a practical matter, may be even more pervasive. Moreover, parity
would require comparable treatment for plaintiffs and defendants sub-
jected to malicious litigation practices. Precedent reflects a policy of
the law to prohibit or to restrict excesses of advocacy. The common
law tradition allows the courts to adapt the law to the exigencies of new
circumstances. It would thus be a logical outgrowth of current law and
legal principles to approve the tort of malicious defense.
This Article sets out a principled method by which courts may cre-
ate a tort of malicious defense. The Article first examines the problem
of bad faith litigation, concluding that the current situation is undesir-
able' 2 and that existing safeguards are not sufficient.' 3 It then discusses
current authority on the tort of malicious defense, finding it inconclu-
sive.' 4 The Article determines that important public policies weigh in
favor of establishing the tort, while traditional policy arguments
against the tort are mistaken.15 The Article finds that there is ample
authority for judicial reform of obsolete laws16 and then sets out the
specific elements of the tort of malicious defense.17 The Article con-
cludes that the creation of the tort of malicious defense is warranted by
the current state of our courts, is fully warranted by our judicial tradi-
tions, and accordingly should be implemented by the courts.' 8
The Problem
When the courts were not so congested, delay not so protracted,
and legal expense and complexity not so formidable, adversarial excess
11. See infra notes 78-101 & accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 19-39 & accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 40-77 & accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 78-101 & accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 102-18 & accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 119-25 & accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 126-74 & accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 175-77 & accompanying text.
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may have been more tolerable. A wait of six or seven months for a
contested trial of probably no more than four or five days, without the
intervening burden of heavy discovery, could be justified in the interest
of zealous and uninhibited advocacy. The injury to the opposing liti-
gant, to other litigants, and to the court system and the drain on the
public purse caused by baseless litigation were not so formidable. The
number of lawyers was small enough that pressures from the bench and
the bar were still effective, and community pressures on the litigants
were not lost because of mobility or metropolitan anonymity. These
conditions, however, no longer exist.
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the 1930's
and of state discovery statutes after World War II brought "free and
open" discovery designed to reduce surprise and gamesmanship in civil
litigation. But the Rules also brought increased costs and abuses of the
process. Court congestion, particularly in major metropolitan areas,
has crowded court calendars and pushed the contested trial three to five
years into the future. 19 Civil trials have also become more complex and
protracted.
Consequently, any judgment for a plaintiff will be recovered only
after extended delay and considerable, largely unrecoverable cost.20
The huge backlog of cases in most jurisdictions21 allows a defendant to
19. See Belli, The Law's Delays: Reforming Unnecessary Delay in Civil Litigation, 8 J.
LEGIS. 16, 16-17 (1981); Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Law-
yers About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 219, 227-29;
Lundergan, Kelly, & Strauss, supra note 9, at 27; Pressman & Morrow, The 72,000 Case
Overload, L.A. LAW., Sept. 1981, at 18. For a statistical analysis of delay in both federal and
state courts, see Grossman, Kritzer, Bumiller & McDougal, Measuring the Pace of Civil Liti-
gation in Federal and State Trial Courts, 65 JUDICATURE 86 (1981). The problem of unneces-
sary delay caused by dilatory tactics has engendered many proposals aimed at encouraging
the early settlement of claims. See, e.g., Cooke, The Highways and Byways of Dispute Reso-
lution, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 611 (1981); Note, Compulsory JudicialArbitration in California:
Reducing the Delay and Expenses of Resolving Uncomplicated Civil Disputes, 29 HASTINGS
L.J. 475 (1973). Chief Justice Burger's speech to the 1982 mid-year meeting of the American
Bar Association addressed the growing problems of delay and lack of finality which obstruct
civil litigation. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982). The Chief Justice
emphasized that even when acceptable results are achieved in a civil case, the victory is often
a hollow one because of the time elapsed, the expenses incurred, and the emotional stress
suffered. Id at 274. Some have suggested an "expedited hearing" where settlements are
encouraged prior to a full scale trial. See Rosenberg, Rient & Rowe, Expenses: The Road-
block to Justice, 20 JUDGES J. 16, 18 (Summer 1981). Although some discovery would be
available and the rules of evidence would be applicable, the procedure would be more infor-
mal with emphasis on resolving claims at a reasonable cost. Id
20. See Adams, Would We Rather Fight Than Settle? The Litigation Explosion: Two
Fundamental Causes, 51 FLA. B.J. 496 (1977); Comment, Controlling the Malicious Defend-
ant, 2 STAN. L. REV. 184, 187-88 (1949).
21. See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, COURT CONGESTION AND DELAY (G. Win-
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delay substantially an eventual settlement. A general denial now buys
a defendant not months, but years. Instead of a default or summary
hearing within 45 to 75 days after filing of the complaint, a plaintiff
must in many places wait more than three to five years. In the
meantime, the defendant uses the plaintiff's money; restrictions on pre-
judgment interest 22 give the defendant, in effect, a low interest or inter-
est-free loan during the course of the litigation.2 3
In contrast, the plaintiff, deprived of the use of the money due,
may be under financial pressure to settle. Therefore, he may be forced
to accept a less favorable settlement than he could have negotiated or
recovered at trial.24 Moreover, the plaintiff will normally incur addi-
tional unrecoverable expenses, such as attorneys' fees, as a result of the
ters ed. 1971); Rosenberg, Status, Causes, and Proposed Remedies, in THE COURTS, THE
PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION (H. Jones ed. 1965); H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN & B. BUCH-
HOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT (1959); Belli, supra note 19, at 19; Bork, Dealing With the
Overloadin Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231 (1976); Friedman, The Six Million Dollar Man."
Litigation and Rights Consciousness in Modern America, 39 MD. L. REV. 661 (1980); Janof-
sky, A.B.A. Attacks Delay and the High Cost of Litigation, 65 A.B.A. J. 1323 (1979).
22. Courts have traditionally been reluctant to award pre-judgment interest. D.
DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.5, at 165 (1973). In the absence of a
statute to the contrary, courts will not award pre-judgment interest on a pecuniary claim
which is not liquidated. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Brookside Mills, Inc., 205 Tenn.
394, 326 S.W.2d 671 (1959) (court reversed award of pre-judgment interest on vacation pay
because the amount was not certain and was disputed on reasonable grounds). Claims for
lost profits or damages resulting from personal injury will not give rise to pre-judgment
interest because the interest is said to be unascertainable prior to trial and final judgment.
D. DOBBS, supra, § 3.5, at 165. But see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3291 (West Supp. 1984) (If the
defendant in a personal injury action refuses an offer to settle and the plaintiff ultimately
obtains a judgment more favorable than the settlement offer, the defendant is liable for
interest at the rate of 10% on the judgment from the date of the settlement offer.). In addi-
tion, the courts do not award pre-judgment interest in the case of a precise monetary claim if
the defendant asserts a defense with respect to the extent or validity of the claims. Inland
Drilling Co. v. Davis Oil Co., 183 Neb. 116, 158 N.W.2d 536 (1968); D. DOBBS, supra, at
167-68. A bad faith defendant may be able, through perjury, to create the appearance of a
defense and thus avoid pre-judgment interest on the amount due.
23. See Belli, supra note 19, at 22. Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3291 (West Supp. 1984) (dis-
cussed supra note 22).
24. Some attorneys suggest that delays tip the scales of justice in favor of those
who must eventually pay money in a suit. "If someone is injured and can only
look forward to redress seven or eight years later, that person may be forced to
settle for less than he is entitled to," a Los Angeles lawyer points out. Moreover,
insurance companies have no incentive to settle a claim when they can delay pay-
ment for years in court and collect interest on that money in the meantime. "The
worst that can happen is that you're going to lose," a Palo Alto attorney explains.
"Why should you settle?"
Lundergan, Kelly & Strauss, supra note 9, at 27. But cf Hersh v. Citizens Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 146 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 1012, 194 Cal. Rptr. 628, 633 (1983) (court assessed $125,000
in damages against the defendants for the prosecution of a frivolous appeal).
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false defense. 25
The ability to cause a financially weak plaintiff to incur additional
costs in pursuit of a valid claim gives additional leverage to a stronger
defendant. As a result, a defendant with the means to litigate has little
incentive to settle early.26 The plaintiff, however, may be under consid-
erable pressure to settle on terms favorable to the defendant 27 As Mel-
25. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Gray v.
Don Miller & Assocs., Inc., 35 Cal. 3d 498, 674 P.2d 253, 198 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1984); Strick-
land v. Williams, 234 Ga. 752, 218 S.E.2d 8 (1975); Salvador v. Popaa, 56 Hawaii 111, 530
P.2d 7 (1975); Frost v. Cedar County Bd. of Supervisors, 163 N.W.2d 432 (Iowa 1968);
Harrison v. Textron, Inc., 367 Mass. 540, 328 N.E.2d 838 (1975). The American rule on
attorneys' fees has been repeatedly criticized in the law reviews, see, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Reim-
bursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792 (1966); Greenberger,
The Cost of Justice." An American Problem, An English Solution, 9 VILL. L. REV. 400 (1964);
Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost ofLitigation, 49 IowA L. REV. 75 (1963);
McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15
MINN. L. REV. 619 (1931); McLaughlin, The Recovery ofAttorneys"Fees." A New Method of
Financing Legal Services, 40 FORD L. REV. 761 (1972), but it has not been rejected by the
courts. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Both
Congress and the state legislatures have enacted many statutory exceptions to the American
rule. See infra note 43. Among the states, only Alaska has adopted a rule of general appli-
cability which treats attorney's fees as costs. ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (1973). Cf. OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 20.080, .085, .094, .096 (1981) (attorneys' fees allowed in personal injury ac-
tions where the amount pleaded or counterclaimed is $3,000 or less; attorneys' fees allowed
in inverse condemnation actions; attorneys' fees allowed in certain debt and contract ac-
tions); WASH. REv. CODE § 4.84.250 (West Supp. 1984) (attorneys' fees allowed as costs in
damage actions of $5,000 or less). Recently, the California legislature codified the federal
bad faith rule which allows a court to tax expenses, including attorneys' fees, to a defendant
who has litigated in bad faith. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 1982). The legislative
finding in connection with this section is particularly interesting:
It is the intent of this legislation to broaden the powers of trial courts to manage
their calendars and provide for expeditious processing of civil actions by authoriz-
ing monetary sanctions now not presently authorized by the interpretation of the
law in Baugess v. Paine (1978) 22 Cal. 3d 626.
1981 Cal. Stat., ch. 762, § 2.
26. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23; Adams, supra note 20, at 497; Brazil,
supra note 19, at 229.
27. Litigation expenses are substantial enough to make the bringing of certain lawsuits
prohibitive. Some have suggested that a case which involves less than $6,000 is not worth
pursuing in California because of the expense of litigation. Rosenberg, Rient & Rowe, supra
note 19, at 17. Claims under $25,000 are subject to the largest proportion of attorneys' fees
in relation to the claim. Id. Moreover, the expenses incurred directly by the litigants repre-
sent only a portion of the total cost of litigation. For example, it costs over $350 per hour to
run a federal district court sitting with a jury. Burger, supra note 19, at 277. In a cost study
of the Los Angeles Superior Courts for the fiscal year 1980-1981, it was determined that it
cost $898 per day to run each civil trial courtroom. Los ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT, supra
note 10, at 3. For an analysis of the rising costs of litigation and some suggested solutions,
see Johnson, Access to Justice in the United States." The Economic Barriers and Some Promis-
ing Solutions, in 2 AccEss TO JUSTICE 913, 962 (1978); see also Epstein, Reducing Litigation
Costsfor Small Cases, 20 JUDGES J. 9, 10 (Spring 1981): "It is a fearsome thing to contem-
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vin Belli has observed: "After a five year delay, the judgment becomes
more a reward to a diligent litigant than an award to a deserving
victim." 28
In light of such abuses, the limited number of effective deterrents
to malicious defensive conduct is all the more striking. PeIjury,
whether in the pleadings, during discovery, or at trial, is at the heart of
every malicious defense, yet there is no civil remedy for perjury29 and
there is little credible threat of a criminal prosecution.30 A defendant
who thus acts in bad faith for his financial gain or to injure a plaintiff
for personal reasons, or who simply believes that this is how the litiga-
tion game is played, may use the litigation process for malicious and
improper purposes without being held accountable.
Additionally, neither substantive law nor any clear professional
limitation on adversarial conduct restrains lawyers from aiding a mali-
cious defendant. If a defendant is not liable for malicious defensive
tactics, his lawyer will be afortiori immune. Though one might expect
the bar to regulate such conduct not subject to civil liability, the ethical
standards governing litigation conduct have been ineffective for a
number of reasons. First, practical application of the standards has
plate a justice system supported by all taxpayers, practical access to which is out of reach for
the great majority of people who need its services."
28. After a five-year delay, the judgment becomes more a reward to a diligent
litigant than an award to a deserving victim. A worker, who is permanently inca-
pacitated and has a family to support, can hardly afford to wait five years to receive
an award. Hospital bills, doctor bills, house payments, food bills, and educational
fees must be paid in the interim. If a claimant cannot be "carried" by his lawyer
and is ineligible for government relief, he must discount his eventual award to an
extent that would be usurious in a commercial transaction.
Belli, supra note 19, at 17.
29. Cf. Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 291 Or. 318, 630 P.2d 840 (1981) (an attor-
ney who intentionally violated duties imposed by statute proscribing an attorney from seek-
ing to mislead a court or jury by any false statement of law or fact had no liability to the
opposing party for damages). See also Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 312 N.W.2d 585
(1981); O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561 (1977).
30. See Comment, Perjury: The Forgotten Offense, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
361, 361 (1974). The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice concluded that perjury was widespread and that effective measures against it were
lacking. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 347 (1968). One commentator has
stated: "Few crimes except fornication are more prevalent or carried off with greater impu-
nity." Whitman, .4 Proposed Solution to the Problem of Perjury in Our Courts, 59 DICK. L.
REV. 127, 127 (1955). In California, for example, there were 88,291 felony defendants prose-
cuted in 1972. Of this number, only 53 were charged with perjury. Comment, supra, at 361.
See also Hibschman, "You Do Solemnly Swearl" or That Perjury Problem, 24 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 901 (1934); McClintock, What Happens to Perjurers, 24 MINN. L. REv. 727
(1940); Purrington, The Frequency ofPeriury, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 67 (1908); Wolfram, Client
Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 809 (1977).
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been subject to considerable disagreement. 31 Second, the disciplinary
boards of the bar historically have declined to pursue vigorously pro-
ceedings against attorneys for violations of these standards. 32 There-
fore, even if state and local bar associations adopt clearer and more
stringent rules against attorney participation in client fraud, the rules
are unlikely to be enforced through disciplinary hearings if the bar dis-
ciplinary boards continue their past practices. Moreover, the discipli-
nary boards do not hear many cases concerning attorney participation
in client fraud because most disciplinary proceedings are initiated by
the client. A client who engaged in fraudulent conduct in concert with
an attorney is unlikely to report the attorney's conduct. Only infre-
quently do the other attorneys, or their clients, or the judges report such
instances.33 Finally, attempts by opposing parties to enforce the disci-
plinary rules through tort litigation have been unsuccessful.3 4 Under
these circumstances, it is not surprising that many lawyers adopt a "no-
holds-barred" approach in defending litigation. In many cases, the
lawyers do this primarily out of a sense of obligation to their clients.
Other lawyers may simply feel they must do so to meet the competition.
31. See J. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR: THE UNETHICAL ETHICS OF LAWYERS
(AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT) 161-66 (1978). The responsibility of an attorney for a client's
bad faith defense is unclear under the present ABA Code of Professional Responsibility.
See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 30, at 819-22. The Model Rules proposed by the Kutak Com-
mission clarify the issue somewhat, but the negative reaction to these proposed rules indi-
cates strong feelings among attorneys in favor of uninhibited advocacy. See, e.g., Clark,
Fear and Loathing in New Orleans: The Sorry Fate of the Kutak Commission's Rules, 17
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 79 (1983); Freedman, Are The Model Rules Unconstitutional?, 35 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 685 (1981); COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MATERIALS ON MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Item 503 (American College of Trial Lawyers), Item 508 (Colorado Bar Association), Item
518 (Florida Bar) (1982). Professor Kramer cites the example of the District of Columbia
Bar referendum on the 1969 version of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) that required lawyers
to "reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal." In the referendum, 74% of the
District of Columbia Bar members voted to "reject any duty to reveal a client's fraud once a
lawyer has called upon the client to rectify the situation." Kramer, Client's Frauds and Their
Lawyers' Obligations: A Study in Professional Irresponsibility, 67 GEo. L.J. 991, 995 n.24
(1979).
32. See, e.g., Wolfram, Barriers to Effective Public Participation in Regulation of the
Legal Profession, 62 MINN. L. REV. 619, 634-36 (1978); Comment, Disbarment in the United
States: Who Shall Do the Noisome Work, 12 COLUM. J.L. &. SOC. PROBS. 1, 71-72 (1975).
33. See Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, andProfessional Regulation, 1976 AM. BAR
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 917, 949, 973; see also SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF Dis-
CIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 6 (1970).
34. See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Nelson v. Miller,
227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980); Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 312 N.W.2d 585
(1981); Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 291 Or. 318, 630 P.2d 840 (1981); O'Toole v.
Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561 (1977).
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Whatever the reason, such tactics can be devastating to a plaintiff with
a valid claim but limited resources.
The following not-so-hypothetical case summaries exemplify the
difficulties encountered by a plaintiff confronting a malicious defend-
ant with the inclination and resources to litigate:
Case .35 A and B are partners in a real estate investment com-
pany. The partnership owns several apartment buildings as well as a
few commercial properties. A is primarily in charge of building remod-
eling and maintenance. B is in charge of the financial side and has
control of the partnership bank accounts. After a dispute over prospec-
tive acquisitions, the partners have a falling out. They agree to termi-
nate the partnership, and A asks for an accounting and distribution of
his share of the partnership assets. B holds up any distribution and
delays the preparation of the accounting for several months. When the
accounting is finally rendered, A objects to several items. First, some
offsets against A's account are not adequately explained. Second, B has
claimed consulting fees in the amount of $12,000, travel expenses in the
amount of $6,000, and miscellaneous expenses in the amount of $7,500.
A strongly suspects that the accounting is fraudulent and that B is at-
tempting to cheat him out of some of his fair share of the assets. A asks
for an explanation, but B refuses to cooperate. The disputed items re-
duce A's share of the assets by approximately $20,000. A's undisputed
overall partnership share is several times that amount, but B refuses to
pay out anything until the accounting dispute is resolved.
A's assets are tied up in the business, and he would experience
financial difficulties without the money. He is confident that the dis-
puted offsets and items are false and wants the matter to be resolved as
quickly and inexpensively as possible. When he consults a lawyer, how-
ever, he is told that it will take years to get a court judgment and that
the attorneys' fees will be substantial, particularly if B is as obstructive
and devious as A has made him out to be.
Case 2.36 C is an electrician specializing in work on commercial
developments. He bids and gets a job on a suburban shopping center
project with D as the general contractor. C works on the job for nine
weeks and is nearly finished when D terminates him. Although C's
work has been adequate and timely, D apparently wants to use C as an
example to the other subcontractors. D wishes to develop the image of
being tough-minded and even a little ruthless when it comes time to
35. Cf. Schmidt Constr., Inc. v. M.J. Hermreck, Inc., No. C 70880 (Super. Ct. Cal., L.A.
Cty. 1975).
36. Cf. Schober v. Aquarius Dev. Co., No. C 59312 (Super. Ct. Cal., L.A. Cty. 1974).
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pay off the subcontractors. D asserts, without foundation, that the ter-
mination was for cause. D disclaims any further liability to C, saying
that the amount then due C for his work was offset by the amount
which D has to spend in order to finish the electrical work. C files a
mechanics lien against the property. The lien is subsequently bonded
off before the project is turned over to the owners. Chas no choice but
to bring suit. If D chooses to conduct a vigorous defense, however, the
time and expense consumed in proving the speciousness of L's case will
never be recouped, and Cmay have to wait years for his compensation.
Case 3. E is a computer sales representative for F Corporation.
The sales reps are paid a monthly salary and receive a bonus every six
months based on performance during the preceding six month period.
E expects a large bonus. F Corporation is having difficulty with its
inventory controls and suspects theft by employees. Because he is
hard-driving and efficient, E is not well liked by his fellow employees,
several of whom honestly but mistakenly suspect E of stealing and re-
port their suspicions to management. Through the industry grapevine,
management also learns that E has been approached by a competitor
and offered a more attractive position and salary. FCorporation man-
agement becomes concerned not only about the thefts but also about
possible disclosure of trade secrets. F Corporation hires an outside
detective agency to investigate, which turns up potentially incriminat-
ing evidence against E. E is thereupon brought to a darkened confer-
ence room at FCorporation headquarters and interrogated against his
will and under threat of criminal prosecution for five hours. Stunned
and cowed, E allows the investigators to search his personal residence,
from which they seize computer parts worth several thousand dollars
under the belief that they are company property. In fact, the property
taken from his home is owned by E, as evidenced by bills of sale.
E quits his employment with F Corporation and asks for his bo-
nus, vacation pay, and vested profit-sharing benefits. He also asks for
the return of his property and a statement clearing him of any wrong-
doing. F Corporation, though aware that its investigation has proved
no wrongdoing on E's part, nevertheless refuses to pay E his bonus or
profit sharing benefits, and delays paying his vacation pay and re-
turning his property. FCorporation also refuses to make any statement
exonerating E of wrongdoing, although the fact of his interrogation and
the charges against him were widely circulated throughout the com-
pany and local industry. Ultimately, FCorporation refuses to do more
than return his property and to make a partial payment of his vacation
pay. On technical pretexts, F Corporation refuses to pay E his bonus
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and profit-sharing benefits. E thereupon consults a lawyer and brings
suit. The F Corporation managers, however, stonewall the lawsuit for
fear of embarassment, although they are aware that E was innocent.
Case 4.37 H is a surgeon with a successful practice. His annual
income exceeds $200,000 per year. W sues H for a divorce and seeks
an equitable property settlement. When Ws attorney attempts to sub-
poena the financial records from H's practice, H's attorney interposes
numerous objections that have no legal basis. During depositions, His
very uncooperative and refuses to disclose several properties and ven-
tures in which he has invested. He is usually late with payment of tem-
porary support, often not paying until a contempt hearing is set. H
knows that most of his delay tactics will not succeed in the long run,
but he hopes that he can wear down W both emotionally and finan-
cially. H's tactics require Wto be adamant at every turn or to forego
some of her rights to preserve her dignity and emotional well-being.
In the foregoing cases, defendants B, D, F, and H are wrong and
either know it or soon find out. The practicalities, however, are that it
suits their financial interests and collateral purposes to deny these
claims. They have the money and are in control. The only recourse for
plaintiffs A, C, E, and W1, if redress is to be had at all, is the courts. If
the defendants follow the familiar course of a general denial, obstruc-
tion of discovery, and no settlement or redress until near or after trial,
then whatever compensation is obtained may be too little and too late.
Each of the prospective plaintiffs in the foregoing cases must ulti-
mately deal with this problem. In the event of a suit, relief will be
between three and five years away in most jurisdictions.38 Prospective
unrecoverable attorneys' fees, at current hourly rates for competent
representation, and court costs, not all recoverable, can be expected to
exceed $10,000. 3 9 Plaintiff's costs could be much higher if the defend-
ant engages in delaying tactics. In the end, the relief afforded by the
law will not compensate for the loss. The legal process increases the
37. Cf. Wolf v. Wolf, 26 A.D.2d 529, 271 N.Y.S.2d 155 (1966).
38. See supra note 19.
39. See, e.g., Rosenberg, Rient & Rowe, supra note 19, at 17:
There also is evidence that the problem is most acute when a litigant with a worthy
cause is not entitled to legal aid, but must face legal expenses out of proportion to
the amount at stake. Cases involving sums in the range of $1,000 to $25,000 are the
hardest hit. When ordinary damage cases of that size are litigated to a conclusion,
the lawyers' fees on both sides soon devour a substantial fraction of the disputed
amount.
See also Epstein, supra note 27, at 10.
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injury by delay, the accompanying emotional distress, and the further
drain on the injured party's financial resources.
Existing Safeguards
Courts have adopted several methods of dealing with the problem
of malicious defense tactics, although they have not yet recognized a
tort of malicious defense. Statutory and common law remedies inhibit
certain cases of malicious defense. Nonetheless, these safeguards are
insufficient to correct the situation.
Attorney's Fees
As a general rule, in American courts a plaintiff will not be
awarded attorney's fees in the absence of a contractual agreement or
some statutory authority.40 The American rule is often defended on
the ground that assertion of potentially just claims and defenses should
not be deterred by the possibility of having to pay the other party's
attorneys' fees. 4 1 The imposition of attorneys' fees, it is argued, would
operate as a penalty upon the exercise of a privilege of citizenship and
may have an especially discouraging impact upon the poor.42 The
American attorneys' fees rule, however, may also tend to discourage
the assertion of meritorious claims by placing on the plaintiff the full
cost of the vindication of his rights.43 Some courts therefore have made
exceptions to the general rule when justice and equity have required it.
40. See supra note 24.
41. See, e.g., Fleishmrann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718
(1967); Young v. Redman, 55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 835-36, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86, 91 (1976).
42. See Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967);
Conte v. Flota Merchante del Estado, 277 F.2d 664, 672 (2d Cir. 1970).
43. If the cost of litigation is high relative to the possible recovery of damages, a party
may decline to prosecute or defend a lawsuit, even if he believes he is in the right. It is not
uncommon for a lawyer to advise a client that a rightful claim is not worth pursuing because
it would cost as much or more to prosecute the case than could possibly be recovered. See
supra note 39. The increasing tendency to make statutory exceptions to the American rule to
encourage the prosecution of meritorious claims implicitly reflects the failure of the Ameri-
can rule to maintain open access to the courts. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(l) (1982) (FTC
rulemaking proceedings concerning unfair and deceptive practices); id § 1918(a) (civil ac-
tion by owner or passenger suffering damages due to violation of federal automobile bumper
standards); id § 1640(a)(3) (violation of consumer credit cost disclosure provisions); id.
§ 1681n(3) (civil liability of consumer credit reporting agencies).
Nonetheless, it would be inappropriate to adopt the English rule, in which attorneys'
fees are awarded to the prevailing party, in lieu of the American rule. For arguments in
favor of adopting the English rule, see, e.g., Bishop, Let's Adopt the English Fees Awards
System, 4 CAL. LAw. 10 (Feb. 1984); Greenberger, supra note 25; Kuenzel, supra note 25.
This solution goes too far in the other direction and may indeed serve to deter the assertion
of meritorious claims or defenses. For an excellent discussion of this problem, see Mallor,
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The Federal Equitable Rule and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure
For at least fifty years, the federal courts have recognized an im-
portant exception to the general rule that each party must bear his own
attorneys' fees." This exception allows recovery of attorneys' fees
when the action or defense is maintained in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. The federal equitable rule does
not alter the general rule in a bona fide dispute; it operates only when
one party has litigated without a credible supporting ground.45
The amendment of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provides another basis on which federal courts can impose liabil-
ity for bad faith defenses. Rule 11 now provides that if an attorney or
party signs a pleading, motion, or other paper, the signature certifies
the good faith and truthfulness of the document.46 In the event a viola-
Punitivie Attorneys' Feesfor Abuses of the Judicial System, 61 N.C.L. REV. 613 (1983). See
also Ehrenzweig, supra note 25.
44. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530
(1962); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939); Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d
494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 186 F.2d 473, 481 (4th Cir.
1951); Cleveland v. Second Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.2d 466, 469 (6th Cir. 1945);
Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 28 F.2d 233, 240-46 (8th Cir. 1928); see also 6
J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.77[2] (2d ed. 1983);
Mallor, supra note 43, at 630-52.
45. The case of Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962), provides an example of the
kind of case meant to be covered by the equitable rule. The Court stated:
In the instant case respondents were callous in their attitude, making no investiga-
tion of libellant's claim and by their silence neither admitting it nor denying it. As
a result ofthat recalcitrance, libellant was/orced to hire a lawyer to go to court and
get what was plainly owed him under laws that are centuries old The de/ault was
wilful andpersistent. It is dficult to imagine a clearer casefor damages sufferedfor
failure to pay maintenance than this one.
369 U.S. at 530-31 (emphasis added).
46. The Rule provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading, motion, or other paper, that to the best of his knowledge, infor-
mation, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. . . . If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the per-
son who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11; Hall, New Rules Amendments Are Far Reaching, 69 A.B.A. J. 1, 640
(1983). See also Note, Liability/or Proceeding with Unfounded Litigation, 33 VAND. L. REV.
743, 754-67 (1980) (commentary on Rule 11 before its recent amendment).
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tion of the rule occurs, the court, on its own motion or the motion of a
party, may impose sanctions. That penalty may include liability for
reasonable expenses incurred because of the bad faith filing, including
reasonable attorneys' fees.
Although the power of the trial judge to impose sanctions for bad
faith defenses may provide some relief for the innocent plaintiff, it is
not a sufficient substitute for the tort proposed here. First, the Rule
granting this power addresses the problem on an ad hoc basis. If the
judge decides for reasons of efficiency not to impose sanctions, the in-
jured party is left with no remedy. Second, because the trial judge em-
powered to impose sanctions also hears the main case on which the
malicious defense tort is based, vigorous presentation of a good faith
defense may be inhibited. A separate action would allow a neutral tri-
bunal to decide the issue without imposing additional responsibilities
on a trial judge already burdened with the speedy and equitable resolu-
tion of the underlying action. Finally, the federal equitable rule and
Rule 11 are remedies available only in federal court.47
The California Malicious Cross-Complaint Rule
Despite the courts' general acceptance of extreme adversarial con-
duct in civil actions, the tort of malicious prosecution imposes some
restrictions on defensive conduct by allowing recovery for a cross-com-
plaint filed for malicious purposes. For example, the California
Supreme Court held in Bertero v. National General Cor. 48 that the il-
ing and prosecution of a fabricated cross-complaint would support a
malicious prosecution action for compensatory and punitive damages.
The court rejected the defendants' argument that the cross-complaint
was simply part of a vigorous defense. 49 Noting that the defendants
47. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 1982) provides for similar controls over bad
faith litigation:
(a) Every trial court shall have the power to order a party or the party's attorney, or
both, to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by an-
other party as a result of tactics or actions not based on good faith which are frivo-
lous or which cause unnecessary delay. Frivolous actions or delaying tactics
include, but are not limited to, making or opposing motions without good faith.
(b) Expenses pursuant to this section shall not be imposed except on notice con-
tained in a party's moving or responding papers; or the court's own motion, after
notice and opportunity to be heard. An order imposing expenses shall be in writ-
ing and shall recite in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order.
California has a similar rule with respect to frivolous appeals. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 907
(West 1980).
48. 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1975).
49. Id. at 52-53, 529 P.2d at 615, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
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could conduct a vigorous defense without resorting to the filing of a
malicious and fabricated action, the court concluded:
Public policy. . . does not limit the right to seek redress for the mali-
cious abuse of the judicial process; such abuse cannot be sanctioned
either in the assertion of affirmative claims in initiating proceedings
or in the affirmative assertion of such claims after the initiation of
proceedings5 °
The court did not distinguish between the harm suffered by an original
defendant in a maliciously prosecuted action and the harm suffered by
a cross-defendant in a groundless cross-complaint. The injury and ex-
pense to the individual and the harm to the judicial system are the
same in both instances.5' The innocent cross-defendant was entitled to
recover damages for attorneys' fees in defending the prior action and
damages for emotional distress and impairment of business reputation
proximately caused by the action.52
The malicious cross-complaint rule is nonetheless inadequate to
meet the problems created by malicious defense tactics. By its nature,
the rule applies only to the affirmative assertion of bad faith counter-
claims. It would thus not apply to strictly defensive tactics such as op-
pressive discovery and other delaying tactics. In addition, the rule
applies only in California and, at most, a few other states.53
The Abuse of Process Cases
The policy against the wrongful use of civil proceedings is also
reflected in the tort of abuse of process. This cause of action is appro-
priate if a legitimate lawsuit has been "perverted to accomplish an ulte-
rior purpose for which it was not designed. ' 54 Abuse of process cases
will arise, for example, in debt collection proceedings when the under-
50. Id at 53, 529 P.2d at 616, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
5 1. The harm to society and to the individual cross-defendant caused by the filing
of a cross-pleading without probable cause and with malice is substantially similar
to that occasioned by the filing of a complaint or other initial pleading known to be
false or meritless. The malicious cross-plaintiff, like the malicious plaintiff, uses
the judicial process as a vehicle for harassing or vexing his adversary or as a means
of coercing the settlement of a collateral matter. The cross-defendant, like the de-
fendant in an original cause maliciously prosecuted, is compelled to expend attor-
ney's fees in defending against the false charge and may suffer the same mental or
emotional distress and possible loss of reputation and standing in the community.
Id. at 51, 529 P.2d at 614, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
52. Id. at 59, 529 P.2d at 620, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
53. See Merrit-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Elgin Coal, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 17, 20 (E.D.
Tenn. 1972); Slee v. Simpson, 91 Colo. 461, 15 P.2d 1084 (1932); Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461,
71 N.W. 558 (1897).
54. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 856. See also Note, supra note 46, at 751-52.
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lying obligation is valid but the means used to collect the debt are
wrongful,55 or when the litigation process has been used wrongfully to
secure payment of a just obligation.56 The tort recognizes that the ad-
versary system itself can promote injustice if one side has superior
knowledge of the system and harbors the inclination to bend the rules.
The tort of abuse of process is intended to limit wrongful adver-
sarial conduct by clients and their attorneys.57 This limit is consistent
with the public policy favoring open access to courts and zealous repre-
sentation.58 Nonetheless, the purview of the tort, which is restricted to
cases involving misuse of valid judicial processes, is too narrow to en-
compass the broad range of injuries caused by malicious actions by
defendants.
55. See Czap v. Credit Bureau, 7 Cal. App. 3d 1, 86 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1970), in which the
California Court of Appeal found a cause of action for abuse of process where the defendant
collection agency had threatened the plaintiff with garnishment of her wages, though the
collection agency knew her wages were exempt by law from garnishment. The defendant
had also attempted to coerce payment of the debt by jeopardizing the plaintiffs employ-
ment. This conduct justified an action by the plaintiff for abuse of process.
56. See Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n, 7 Cal. 3d 94, 496 P.2d 817, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 745 (1972), in which the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant collection agency had
knowingly filed debt collection actions in the improper county for the sole purpose of mak-
ing defense of the action more difficult. The supreme court held the allegation, if established
at trial, would show a "mass 'abuse of process'" and found injunctive relief to be appropri-
ate. Id. at 103, 496 P.2d at 823, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
57. For example, in Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780 (1949), the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that an attorney could be liable for abuse of process and
quoted from an earlier Wisconsin case:
An attorney at law is an officer of the court. The nature of his obligations is both
public and private. His public duty consists in his obligation to aid the administra-
tion of justice; his private duty, to faithfully, honestly, and conscientiously repre-
sent the interests of his client. In every case that comes to him in his professional
capacity, he must determine wherein lies his obligations to the public and his obli-
gations to his client, and to discharge this duty properly requires the exercise of a
keen discrimination, and wherever the duties to his client conflict with those he
owes to the public as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, the
former must yield to the latter. He therefore occupies what may be termed a quasi
judicial office.
Id. at 240-41,28 N.W.2d at 791 (quoting Langen v. Borkowski, 188 Wisc. 277,301,206 N.W.
181, 190 (1925)).
58. As pointed out by the New York Court of Appeals:
While it is true that public policy mandates free access to the courts for redress of
wrongs. . . and our adversarial system cannot function without zealous advocacy,
it is also true that legal procedure must be utilized in a manner consonant with the
purpose for which that procedure was designed. Where process is manipulated to
achieve some collateral advantage, whether it be denominated extortion, blackmail
or retribution, the tort of abuse of process will be available to the injured party.
Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 404, 343 N.E.2d
278, 283, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 643 (1975) (citations omitted).
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Bad Faith Insurance Cases
It is well established that the adversary model of litigation is not
fully applicable to the processing and adjudication of insurance
claims.59 Defendant insurance companies may not insist that an in-
sured has no claim until the matter is settled in a court of law.
For example, in Fletcher v. Western National Lfe Insurance Co.,60
a California court upheld liability of an insurance company for its bad
faith conduct during the negotiation of a claim. Fletcher involved a
claim for payments on a disability insurance policy. The defendant
insurance company sought to minimize its liability first by limiting the
claim, then by denying the claim altogether and threatening a claim of
its own. In addition, the defendant demonstrated its knowledge that
the economic need of the claimant gave it leverage in settlement negoti-
ations. The appellate court affirmed the jury's award of compensatory
and punitive damages, noting that "[s]ettlement implies the existence of
a good faith dispute, and there is no public policy in favor of an at-
tempt to coerce settlement of a non-existent dispute by outrageous
means."
6 1
Although the bad faith insurance cases are sometimes character-
ized as reflecting the unique circumstances of the insurance industry,62
the court's observation that "there is no public policy in favor of an
attempt to coerce settlement of a non-existent dispute by outrageous
means" 63 is an important principle of general applicability. Nonethe-
less, though the insurance cases can give guidance to the development
of a tort of malicious defense, their applicability only to the relation-
ship between an insurer and its insured prevents them from providing
the broad protection needed in the area of malicious defense.
The Bad Faith Business Tort
The policy that an insurance company may not conduct a no-
59. See, e.g., Thomas v. Allstate Ins. Co., 443 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1971); Coppage v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. 379 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1967); Transport Ins. Co. v. Michigan Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co., 340 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Safeway Moving & Storage Corp. v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 317 F. Supp. 238 (E.D. Va. 1970); Greenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d
566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d
675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978).
60. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
61. -d at 396, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 89-90.
62. See, e.g., Iron Mountain Sec. Storage v. American Specialty Foods, Inc., 457 F.
Supp. 1158, 1166-68 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Marina View
Heights Dev., Inc., 66 Cal. App. 3d 101, 135 n.8, 135 Cal. Rptr. 802, 822 n.8 (1977); Farris v.
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 284 Or. 453, 463, 587 P.2d 1015, 1020 (1978).
63. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 396, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 89-90.
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holds-barred defense against a claimant generally has been restricted to
the insurance area. However, because the bad faith insurance tort is
grounded on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing which is im-
plied in every contract, the question of extending the tort beyond the
insurance area has been raised frequently.64 Recently, the California
Supreme Court held that a party to a commercial contract could be
liable in tort for a bad faith breach. In Seaman's Direct Buying Service
v. Standard Oil Co.,65 the defendant, Standard Oil, entered into an
agreement in 1972 with Seaman's, a closely held corporation composed
of three shareholders, to provide Seaman's with marine fuel as re-
quired. Subsequent to the agreement the fuel market changed from a
buyer's market to a seller's market. Standard consequently adopted a
"no new business" policy and sought to deny its obligation to provide
fuel to Seaman's. 66 Standard's efforts to avoid its contractual obliga-
tion included an appeal of an order by the federal government to pro-
vide fuel. The appeal was ultimately unsuccessful, and Standard was
ordered to fulfill supply obligations "upon the filing of a court decree
that a valid contract existed under state law." 67 Seaman's asked Stan-
dard to stipulate to the existence of a valid contract in order to avoid
the problem and delay of litigating what they both knew to be the case.
The Standard representative, however, laughed at the Seaman's request
and said, "See you in court."' 68 By 1975, Seaman's had discontinued
operations. Soon thereafter, it brought suit against Standard Oil for
breach of contract, fraud, breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, and interference with an advantageous business rela-
tionship. Experiencing the usual delays, the case was finally tried in
197969 and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, awarding both
compensatory damages and punitive damages.70
64. See Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: *hen, I/4t All, Should It
Be Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 425 (1981); Louderback &
Jurika, Standards/or Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F.L. REV.
187 (1982).
65. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
66. Id at 760-62, 686 P.2d at 1161-62, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357-58.
67. Id at 762, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
68. Id
69. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., No. 57371 (Super Ct. Cal.,
Humboldt County, judgment entered Nov. 20, 1979).
70. On the breach of contract count, the jury awarded compensatory damages of
$397,050. For the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the jury awarded
$397,050 in compensatory damages and $11,058,810 in punitive damages. On the count for
intentional interference with an advantageous relationship, the jury awarded $1,588,200 in
compensatory damages and $11,058,810 in punitive damages. 36 Cal. 3d at 762, 686 P.2d at
1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
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The California Supreme Court, while acknowledging that the cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing was implied in all contracts, never-
theless was reluctant to recognize a tort remedy for its breach in cases
outside the insurance area. "When we move from such special rela-
tionships to consideration of the tort remedy in the context of the ordi-
nary commercial contract, we move into largely uncharted and
potentially dangerous waters."' 7' As a consequence, the court sought,
and found, a narrower ground for its decision. Without deciding
whether breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing will give
rise to tort remedies in the ordinary commercial context, the court rec-
ognized an action for bad faith breach of contract when the defendant
"in bad faith and without probable cause" denies the existence of the
contract.72 In justification of this holding, the court used language that
is relevant to the problem of bad faith defenses in general:
It has been held that a party to a contract may be subject to tort
liability, including punitive damages, if he coerces the other party to
pay more than is due under the contract terms through the threat of a
lawsuit made "without probable cause and with no belief in the exist-
ence of the cause of action.". . There is little dfference, in princigle,
between a contracting party obtaining excess payment in such a man-
ner, and a contracting party seeking to avoid all liability on a meritori-
ous contract claim by adopting a '"tonewall" position (' see you in
court") without probable cause and with no belief in the existence of a
defense. Such conduct goes beyond the mere breach of a contract.73
This demonstrates the court's awareness that the problem of bad faith
defenses, or "stonewalling," cannot be resolved through traditional
contract remedies. Its reluctance, however, to fashion a broader rem-
edy to deal with this problem probably indicates the court's belief that
the term "good faith and fair dealing" raises more questions than it
resolves. "Good faith and fair dealing" arises from the substantive law
of contracts and thus, at best, touches only indirectly the more wide-
spread phenomenon of bad faith litigation.74 While the Seaman's deci-
sion is a welcome recognition of the problem, its limited holding cannot
71. Id at 769, 686 P.2d at 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63.
72. Id
73. Id (quoting Adams v. Crater Well Drilling, Inc., 276 Or. 789, 794, 556 P.2d 679,
681 (1976)) (emphasis added).
74. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Bird carefully limited the scope of the tort
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Chief Justice Bird argued that the
court should have based its holding on the implied covenant, but only when the breaching
party denies the existence of the contract in bad faith. Id at 777-80, 686 P.2d at 1172-74, 206
Cal. Rptr. at 368-70. The parties to a contract may expect the other side to breach and pay
damages for such breach, but not to deny the existence of the contract in order to escape
damages altogether. As such, Chief Justice Bird's approach would not apply in many bad
faith defense situations.
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be, nor was it intended to be, a sufficient safeguard against malicious
defenses.
The Prima Facie Tort
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides another possible rem-
edy for injuries of the sort at issue here. Section 870 of the Restatement
describes a general principle for analysis of intentional conduct that
causes harm even though the conduct may not be thought to fit readily
into a generally recognized category of tort liability:
One who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability
to the other for that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and
not justifiable under the circumstances. This liability may be im-
posed although the actor's conduct does not come within a tradi-
tional category of tort liability.75
This is known as the prima facie tort or the innominate tort.76
The commentary to the section separates the analysis into four
parts: (1) the nature and the seriousness of the harm to the injured
party; (2) the nature and the significance of the interests promoted by
the actor's conduct; (3) the character of the means used by the actor;
and (4) the actor's motive.77 The analysis will clearly apply to a situa-
tion in which a plaintiff has been injured by the malicious tactics of the
defendant.
The Restatement's provision for innominate torts impliedly recog-
75. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 870.
76. For a discussion of the prima facie tort doctrine, see Brown, The Rise and
Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort Princile, 54 Nw. U. L. REv. 563 (1959); For-
kosch, An Analysis of the "Prima Facie Tort" Cause ofction, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 465 (1957).
The recent decision in Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) con-
tains an excellent discussion of the prima facie tort doctrine. In that case, the court recog-
nized a claim for the intentional stopping payment of a check given in settlement of an
insurance claim. Noting the need for tort doctrine to develop as conditions in society
change, the court stated:
It is clear that modem scholarship considers that there exists a residue of tort liabil-
ity which has not been explicated in specific forms of tort action and which is
available for the courts to develop as common law tort actions as the needs of
society require such a development .... The emerging products liability recov-
ery theories and the relatively recent development of theories in the recovery of
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress are demonstrative of the
willingness of the courts to draw upon traditional concepts of tort liability and
impose liability in new forms and under new factual situations.
611 S.W.2d at 268 (citations omitted). See also Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904);
Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 343 N.E.2d 278,
380 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975); Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70
N.E.2d 401 (1946); Cullen v. Dickenson, 33 S.D. 27, 144 N.W. 656 (1913); Reuter, Physician
Countersuits, A Catch-22, 14 U.S.F.L. REv. 203, 213-17 (1980).
77. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 870.
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nizes the need for development in the law to be guided by principle, not
solely by precedent. The tort furthers the policy that one who inten-
tionally injures another without justification should be held accounta-
ble for the ensuing harm. The present circumstances of litigation, with
the increased costs and delay, also warrant application of this general
principle to the tort of malicious defense.
As it exists, however, the innominate tort fails to provide a sure
remedy for abusive litigation conduct by defendants. Although the ele-
ments of the tort adapt to the circumstances of a malicious defense,
their flexibility derives in part from their generality. Although the
prima facie tort thus provides general guidelines for the courts in
resolving unusual legal problems, malicious defensive tactics occur so
frequently that a more precise and specific remedy is needed.
The Status of Existing Authority
Jurisdictions have been split on the advisability of creating a tort
of malicious defense. Many jurisdictions have discussed the tort only
in dicta.78 Some of these courts have impliedly recognized the validity
of the tort,79 while others have seemed to deny its validity.80 In certain
minority jurisdictions, which limit the tort of malicious prosecution, the
courts have clearly denied the existence of an action for malicious de-
fense. 81 But the tort has been explicitly denied in only one majority
jurisdiction, in a decision based on clearly erroneous logic. 82 To date,
no court has provided a disciplined, principled argument against the
tort of malicious defense.
For example, in Eastin v. Bank of Stockton,83 the California
Supreme Court commented on the tort of malicious defense in the
course of recognizing a cause of action for malicious prosecution.
While conceding that the tort of malicious defense would not be barred
78. See, e.g., Ritter v. Ritter, 381 Ill. 549, 556-57, 46 N.E.2d 41, 45 (1943); Kolka v.
Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 469-70, 71 N.W. 558, 561 (1897).
79. See Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461,469-70,71 N.W. 558, 561 (1897); Cisson v. Pickens
Say. & Loan, 258 S.C. 37, 43, 186 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1972). Cf. Hoyt v. Macon, 2 Colo. 113,
120 (1873). See generally Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 901 (1975).
80. See, e.g., Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 52-53, 529 P.2d 608, 615,
118 Cal. Rptr. 184, 191 (1974); Eastin v. Bank of Stockton, 66 Cal. 123, 127,4 P. 1106, 1109-
10 (1884).
81. See, e.g., Ritter v. Ritter, 381 Ill. 549, 556, 46 N.E.2d 41, 44 (1943); Wetmore v.
Mellinger, 64 Iowa 741, 744, 18 N.W. 870, 871 (1884); Johnson v. Walker-Smith Co., 47
N.M. 310, 312, 142 P.2d 546, 548 (1943); Abbott v. Thorne, 34 Wash. 692, 696, 76 P. 302,
303-04 (1904); see also supra note 1.
82. Baxter v. Brown, 83 Kan. 302, 111 P. 430 (1910).
83. 66 Cal. 123, 4 P. 1106 (1884).
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due to contrary English precedents 84 or because of concern for multi-
plicity of litigation,85 the court stated in dictum that a defendant's right
to tender a vigorous defense outweighed the reasons for recognizing the
tort.86 Despite the age and questionable logic of the Eastin decision,
recent cases have indicated that it remains good law.87 Nonetheless, it
is clear that the tort of malicious defense has not been considered on
the merits in California. 88
In minority jurisdictions, which require arrest or special injury for
an action for malicious prosecution,89 courts customarily have declined
to recognize the tort of malicious defense. 90 For example, in Ritter v.
Ritter,9' the Illinois Supreme Court denied recovery for expenses prox-
imately caused by the defendant's wrongful defense. 92 The court rea-
soned that because the defendant would not have had a malicious
prosecution action based solely on overzealous advocacy, the plaintiff
should not be given a remedy: "Equal justice forbids treating one party
to a suit more generously than the other." 93 Thus, the basis for the
rejection was to retain parity between plaintiffs and defendants.
This reasoning, however, would not bar malicious defense actions
84. Id. at 126, 4 P. at 1109.
85. Id. at 127, 4 P. at 1109.
86. Id. at 127, 4 P. at 1109-10. The Eastin court cited no authority in support of the
proposition that a defendant has a legal right to tender a defense no matter how groundless.
The court did not expressly consider the case for the tort of malicious defense, but relied on
an article that focused on malicious prosecution. Lawson, The Actionfor the Malicious Pros-
ecution Of A Civil Suit, 21 AM. L. REG. 281, 370 (1882). The article, however, did not ex-
pressly consider the question of malicious defense and cited no judicial authority in support
of its theory.
87. See, e.g., Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 184 (1974). There the court was faced with the question whether the filing of a
groundless cross-complaint would support an action for malicious prosecution. The Bertero
court, citing the Eastin dictum, seemed to limit the scope of the Eastin case by stating that it
stands only for the proposition that the right of a defendant, involuntarily haled into court,
to conduct a vigorous defense must be protected. The court refused, however, to establish
the tort of malicious defense. Id. at 52-53, 529 P.2d at 615, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 191 ("We do
not propose to establish [the tort of malicious defense] by our holding here."). As in Eastin,
the focus of the supreme court's analysis was on malicious prosecution, through the filing of
a cross-complaint.
88. Before Bertero, Eastin was the only California case to mention the possibility.
Neither case actually examined the issue.
89. See supra note I.
90. See, e.g., Ritter v. Ritter, 381 Il. 549, 556, 46 N.E.2d 41, 44 (1943); Wetmore v.
Mellinger, 64 Iowa 741, 744, 18 N.W. 870, 871 (1884); Johnson v. Walker-Smith Co., 47
N.M. 310, 312, 142 P.2d 546, 548 (1943); Wolf v. Wolf, 26 A.D.2d 529, 271 N.Y.S.2d 155
(1966); Abbot v. Thorne, 34 Wash. 692, 696, 76 P. 302, 303-04 (1904).
91. 381 Ill. 549, 46 N.E.2d 41 (1943).
92. Id. at 556, 46 N.E.2d at 45.
93. Id.
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in the majority of American jurisdictions, which do not restrict mali-
cious prosecution to cases involving special injury.94 Conversely, parity
should require that if defendants may avail themselves of the tort of
malicious prosecution, plaintiffs should be accorded a remedy for bad
faith opposition to their claims.
In only one case has a court in an American majority malicious
prosecution jurisdiction expressly held against the tort of malicious de-
fense. In that case, Baxter v. Brown,95 the prior action involved a suit
on a note and mortgage in which the defendant denied allegations of
the complaint known to be true for the purpose of causing the plaintiff
to incur significant expenses in proving his case. The Kansas Supreme
Court considered whether the defendant could be held legally responsi-
ble for the baseless defense and concluded that he could not:
Indeed, it has been said that self-defense is the first law of nature,
and one who physically assaults another cannot recover damages of
the other for physical injuries inflicted so long as the other simply
acts on the defensive and does no more than is necessary to repel the
attack; even if the assailant be killed in the affray, if the assailed does
nothing more than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances
to defend his own life, he is not responsible either civilly or
criminally.96
This odd language seems to suggest that our legal system has not fully
shaken off the vestiges of trial by battle. The opinion was devoid of
any reason for declining to recognize the tort besides the lack of prece-
dent. The case is thus of questionable value for an inquiry into the
policies behind the tort of malicious defense.
Other jurisdictions, however, have impliedly recognized the tort.
In Cisson v. Pickens Savings & Loan Association,97 the parties had been
involved in a prior lawsuit in which the savings and loan association
had intervened as a defendant in an action by Cisson to foreclose on a
mechanic's lien. Cisson was successful in that case and brought a sec-
ond action against the savings and loan association, charging it, inter
alia, with abuse of process and malicious prosecution. The South Car-
olina Supreme Court noted that the malicious prosecution action was
based on an alleged wrongful intervention and defense, not wrongful
instigation of a judicial proceeding. In dictum, however, the court indi-
cated that the action could be "predicated on the interposition of a de-
94. See supra note 1.
95. 83 Kan. 302, 111 P. 430 (1910).
96. Id at 305, 111 P. at 431. It is significant in assessing the strength of the Baxter
precedent that the court noted this issue had not been discussed in the plaintiff's brief, nor
had any authority been cited to support a recovery on this basis. Id at 304, 111 P. at 430.
97. 258 S.C. 37, 186 S.E.2d 822 (1972).
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fense by a defendant, where the other conditions of an action for
malicious prosecution are met."98 The court nonetheless affirmed the
judgment against Cisson on the merits.
Thus, while existing case law at first blush seems to be opposed to
the tort of malicious defense, closer analysis reveals no inconsistency
between the tort and the law in the majority of American jurisdictions.
Outside minority jurisdictions, only one court has explicitly ruled
against the tort, but the rationale of the decision is clearly faulty.99
Other courts in majority jurisdictions have either skirted the issue' °° or
seemed to accept the tort.10 The majority of American jurisdictions
thus clearly are free of controlling precedent precluding recognition of
the tort of malicious defense.
The Policies Favoring and Disfavoring the Tort
of Malicious Defense
Lacking clear precedent on the question, a court considering
whether to recognize a cause of action for malicious defense must care-
fully weigh the policies in support of and in opposition to the tort. Our
judicial system permits certain fetters on advocacy to preserve judicial
integrity and efficiency. 10 2 The judicial system often restrains bad faith
conduct on the part of litigants. 103 On the other hand, our system rec-
ognizes a defendant's right to conduct a vigorous defense. 104 This con-
cern is enhanced by the notion that a person being haled into court is
not there of his own free will and must therefore be accorded certain
additional protections. Judicial efficiency may also weigh against crea-
tion of such a cause of action. On balance, however, the seriousness of
the concerns favoring the tort of malicious defense overcome the signif-
icant but less compelling reasons for denying the tort.
The Policies in Favor of the Tort of Malicious Defense
The policies supporting the recognition of a tort of malicious de-
fense are threefold: (1) deterrence of bad faith conduct; (2) mainte-
nance of the integrity of the judicial process; and (3) preservation of
judicial economy. The primary reason for the creation of the tort of
98. Id. at 43, 186 S.E.2d at 825.
99. See supra note 96 & accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 86-87 & accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 97-98 & accompanying text.
102. See infra note 105 & accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 44-77 & accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 107-11 & accompanying text.
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malicious defense is to deter bad faith conduct on the part of defend-
ants. If a defendant knows he cannot be held liable for the expenses a
plaintiff incurs contesting a frivolous defense, there is little to inhibit
such conduct. The ability to impose unrecoverable expenses on the
other side can be a significant power. In the event the opportunity
arises to force a settlement by threatening prolonged litigation, the
temptation to resort to bad faith measures may become irresistible. If,
however, the defendant may be held liable for damages proximately
caused by the bad faith defense, the advantage of such tactics is greatly
diminished. By removing the incentive for bad faith conduct, the tort
of malicious defense would tend to limit the use of such practices by
even the most vigorous adversaries.
It is a well established principle that courts will not permit them-
selves to become agents for the commission of recognized wrongs. 105 If
a defendant may use the judicial process to delay, diminish, or even
defeat a valid claim, then the court has in effect become a partner in the
abuse. The essential policy question is whether there is any adversarial
conduct which will not be tolerated by the courts. The court should
not, by default, acquiesce in conduct which is designed to perpetrate
fraud or injustice. If such conduct goes unchecked, public confidence
in the law and the legal profession will be undermined. By granting a
plaintiff a remedy for injury due to a defendant's bad faith litigation,
the tort of malicious defense ensures that the court will not remain a
silent partner in such oppressive conduct.
Recognition of malicious defense will also aid the courts in dealing
with the problem of congestion and delay. This problem has become
self-perpetuating because the delay itself imparts the motive for the de-
fendant to misuse the court processes. Allowing a defendant to require
the plaintiff to prove a case against wholly unjustified opposition also
increases the cost of litigation not only to the parties but also to the
public, which pays most of the cost of the court system.t0 6
Arguments Against Recognition of the Tort of Malicious Defense
Three policy considerations weigh against establishing the tort: (1)
the defendant's right to conduct a vigorous defense; (2) the fact that the
defendant does not initiate the action, but rather has been haled into
105. This is what was troubling about the judicial enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants. The resort to the judicial process for enforcement of these covenants meant that
the court could not be neutral. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I (1948); see also supra note
106. See supra note 10.
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court; and (3) preservation of judicial economy. The strongest argu-
ment against the recognition of the tort of malicious defense is the de-
fendant's right to an untrammeled defense. That principle is clearly
expressed in dictum from a case rejecting the tort of malicious prosecu-
tion in the absence of special injury:
When disputes reach the litigious stage, usually some malice is pres-
ent on both sides. Friendly tort suits are not common . . .. Some
margin of safety in asserting rights, though they turn out to be
groundless and their assertion accompanied by some degree of ill-
will, must be maintained. Otherwise litigation would lead, not to an
end of disputing, but to its beginning, and rights violated would go
unredressed for fear of the danger of asserting them.' 07
Other cases have applied the same principle to defendants. 0 8
It is necessary to provide some breathing space for advocacy so
that rights do not go unasserted for fear of liability. The margin of
safety on the defense side, however, has been too broad. It allows de-
fendants to have their day in court but, ironically, tends to restrict over-
all access to the judicial process. 10 9 As a consequence, the courts'
ability to mete out justice is impaired, and individual rights become
more difficult to assert. The theoretical rights of a defendant inclined
to exploit the legal system when he has no credible defense must yield
to general concerns for judicial economy and the rights of those with
valid disputes needing adjudication.
Moreover, to argue that access to the courts militates against a ma-
licious defense tort would also counsel against recognition of the tort of
107. Melvin v. Pence, 130 F.2d 423, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1942). See also Peckham v. Union
Fin. Co., 48 F.2d 1016, 1017-18 (D.C. Cir. 1931); Ammerman v. Newman, 384 A.2d 637, 641
(D.C. 1978); Wetmore v. Mellinger, 64 Iowa 741, 744, 18 N.W. 870, 871 (1884); O'Toole v.
Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 420, 569 P.2d 561, 565 (1977). It is for this reason that malicious
prosecution is said to be not a favored action. See Babb v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 841, 847,
479 P.2d 379, 382, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 182 (1971). This observation, however, may be over-
stated, as indicated by the court in Griswold v. Home, 19 Ariz. 56, 59-60, 165 P. 318, 319
(1917):
It is frequently said that actions for malicious prosecution have never been favored
in law. The idea may, perhaps, be better expressed by saying that such actions are
guarded and their principles strictly adhered to. When this is done and the proper
elements to support the action have been presented it will be readily upheld. The
reasons for this must at once be obvious. The purpose of the law is to protect
individuals in their just rights.
See also supra note 58; Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d
397, 404, 343 N.E.2d, 278, 283, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 643 (1975).
108. See Young v. Redman, 55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 835-36, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86, 91 (1976);
Mashon v. Haddock, 190 Cal. App. 2d 151, 180-81, 11 Cal. Rptr. 865, 881 (1961); Ritter v.
Ritter, 381 Ill. 549, 556-57, 46 N.E.2d 41, 44 (1943); Baxter v. Brown, 83 Kan. 302, 305, 111
P. 430, 431 (1910).
109. See supra note 19 & accompanying text.
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malicious prosecution. Equity demands that malicious plaintiffs and
defendants be treated the same. "Equal justice forbids treating one
party to a suit more generously than the other.""I 0 It makes no sense
that a plaintiff should be denied access to the courts to recover for mali-
cious defensive tactics in a jurisdiction where a defendant's right to re-
cover for the same kind of injury is generally accepted.
The threat of inhibiting the assertion of an apparently unmeritori-
ous defense that later proves to be meritorious may be a persuasive
argument against adoption of a malicious defense tort. In such circum-
stances, a defendant's rights might be denied from fear of the danger of
asserting them. Neither party to a suit should be deterred by the threat
of monetary damages from asserting its position in a forceful and even
aggressive manner.'
The tort of malicious defense may also be argued to have an ad-
verse effect on the attorney/client relationship. Adoption of a mali-
cious prosecution or malicious defense tort necessarily requires the
attorney to adjudicate, at least to some extent, the claim or defense. On
its face, this situation does not conform to the traditional adversarial
model, for the attorney is placed in the posture of having to prejudge
the merits of the case.
This, however, is not an unfamiliar role. Attorneys traditionally
have screened matters before accepting a case. It has never been the
practice of attorneys to accept every matter that comes through the of-
fice door. An attorney screens prospective litigation for credibility, if
not in the interest of the judicial process, then at least in his own inter-
ests or those of his clients. In particular, this is the case with plaintiffs'
attorneys, who, before bringing suit, must ascertain the validity of a
claim, to avoid the possibility of a malicious prosecution action.
Nevertheless, the courts traditionally have accorded more defer-
110. Ritter v. Ritter, 381 III. 549, 556, 45 N.E. 2d 41, 45 (1943) (denying recovery for
malicious defense in a minority jurisdiction, requiring special injury for recovery for mali-
cious prosecution).
I I I. See, e.g., Fleischman Corp. v. Maier Brewing, 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); Young v.
Redman, 55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 835-36, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86, 91 (1976); Mashon v. Haddock, 190
Cal. App. 2d 151, 180-81, It Cal. Rptr. 865, 881 (1961). See generallyM. FREEDMAN, LAW-
YERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975). Implicit in the defense of unrestricted
advocacy may be the view that there is no objective standard to ascertain truth. For exam-
ple, Jethro Lieberman quotes Monroe Freeman as saying (albeit in hyperbole): "There's no
such thing as a frivolous position." J. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR: THE UNETHICAL
ETHICS OF LAWYERS (AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT) 161 (1978). This suggests that any tactic
which furthers the interest of a client may be used in litigation. It may be questioned,
however, whether this serves the interests of justice in the particular case or the interests of
the legal system generally. Id at 161-66.
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ence to defendants than to plaintiffs with respect to the range of per-
missible litigation conduct. In Eastin v. Bank of Stockton,1 2 the
California Supreme Court distinguished between the position of the
plaintiff and that of the defendant with regard to malicious tactics:
The plaintiff sets the law in motion; if he does so groundlessly and
maliciously, he is the cause of the defendant's damage. But the de-
fendant stands only on his legal rights-the plaintiff having taken his
case to court, the defendant has the privilege of calling upon him to
prove it to the satisfaction of the judge or jury, and he is guilty of no
wrong in exercising this privilege.' 13
It is misleading, however, to characterize a defendant as involun-
tarily haled into court in a case involving malicious defense. A defend-
ant who, in bad faith, forces a plaintiff to prove the validity of an
obligation or debt that the parties know to be legitimate has in effect
precipitated the litigation by the unjustified refusal to pay. 14 To say
that the plaintiff has initiated the litigation is like blaming the victim
for causing the accident.
Ultimately, the relative positions of the parties are irrelevant to the
issue of what constitutes permissible adversary conduct. Neither plain-
tiff nor defendant should be immunized against responsibility for out-
rageous actions. Moreover, a vigorous defense can be distinguished
from a malicious defense.' 15 A defendant may require the plaintiff to
prove a prima facie case. This is required in most jurisdictions even if
the defendant does not appear." 6 It is quite another thing, however,
112. 66 Cal. 123, 4 P. 1106 (1884).
113. Id. at 127, 4 P. at 1109-10 (quoting Lawson, The Action of the Malicious Prosecution
of a Civil Suit, 21 AM. LAW REG. 281, 370 (1882)).
114. Consider the hypothetical cases described supra, text accompanying notes 35-37. In
case 1, one partner is unable to get his share of the partnership assets and is presented with a
spurious accounting by the other partner. The electrician in case 2 has performed his work,
but has been terminated from the job and denied payment for the work. The computer sales
representative in case 3 is entitled to his bonus and vested profit sharing benefits as well as
damages for false imprisonment. Faced with the defendants' refusal to pay the obligation,
the plaintiffs in these three cases have no choice but to resort to the courts to enforce their
rights. The plaintiff in case 4 chooses to bring the divorce action, but the defendant's deci-
sion to obstruct and prolong the litigation with the bad faith defense has significantly ex-
panded the scope of the controversy. The defendants will also incur litigation expenses, but
these expenses may be outweighed by the added leverage to force a favorable settlement.
Under such circumstances, the defendant is not in any meaningful sense involuntarily haled
into court.
115. Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 52-53, 529 P.2d 608, 615, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 184, 191 (1974). See also Levinson, Bertero v. National General Corporation: Drawing
the Line Between an Aggressive Defense and a Malicious Prosecution, 4 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 739 (1977).
116. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 585 (West 1976) (requires a hearing in all actions
other than contract). A number of jurisdictions have established, by judicial decision, that a
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for the defendant to defend affirmatively without any credible basis or
to attempt to create such a basis for defense through false pleadings or
perjured testimony. For the latter, the law should offer no protection.
Finally, the argument which historically has characterized the op-
position to a tort of malicious prosecution, that such a tort would lead
to a multiplicity of lawsuits, has not been born out by experience. As
early as Eastin, that contention was dismissed by the California
Supreme Court, which noted that such suits are inhibited by the high
burden of proof l117 Malicious prosecution actions have not clogged the
courts or led to unending litigation." 8
Developing a New Tort
The judicial system has always adopted measures to deal with the
misuse of its processes. In the absence of sufficient remedies, courts
have fashioned remedies using the principles of established law. The
state of the current law is such that the tort of malicious defense could
be recognized as the logical consequence of established legal principles
discouraging the prosecution and defense of claims without legitimate
basis.
Besides the tort of malicious prosecution, courts have allowed civil
damages for the wrongful use of judicial processes." 19 In addition, the
federal courts have long utilized their equitable powers to award attor-
defaulting defendant is entitled to notice and a hearing to assess the amount of damages
owing to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Hensley v. Brown, 617 S.W.2d 867 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981);
Bonner v. American Fin. Mktg. Corp., 181 Conn. 57, 434 A.2d 323 (1980); Ramey v. Hewitt,
188 A.2d 350 (D.C. 1963); Higbee v. Ambassador Taxi, Inc., 369 Mass. 967, 341 N.E.2d 258
(1976); Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 586 (1967).
117. Eastin, 66 Cal. at 127, 4 P. at 1109.
118. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 853. "As for practical results, the testimonies of the
judges in other jurisdictions concur to the effect that this rule has brought to the courts no
crowd of rashly importunate litigants." Peerson v. Ashcraft Cotton Mills, 201 Ala. 348, 349,
78 So. 204, 205 (1917). A more current assessment is found in Note, Promoting Recovery by
Claimants in Iowa Malicious Prosecution Actions, 64 IowA L. REV. 408, 418 (1979): "[In
jurisdictions in which proof of a special injury is not necessary, the judicial system has suf-
fered from 'no crowd of rashly importunate litigants' and there has been no resultant flood
of interminable litigation." See also 75 HARV. L. REy. 629, 630 (1962): "The scarcity of
malicious prosecution suits in jurisdictions that do not require special harm suggests that the
requirement plays no significant role in maintaining free access to the courts and that its
abandonment would not lead 'to a flood of litigation.'"; 28 S. CAL. L. REV. 427, 428 (1955):
[Tlhose jurisdictions which do not insist on a showing of special injuries have not
been deluged with litigation. The fear of a multiplicity of suits has not been real-
ized because the suitor who has sustained the burden of one action will not assume
the expense of a second suit unless he has a strong guaranty that he can convince a
jury that the original action was instituted maliciously and without probable cause.
119. See supra notes 54-58 & accompanying text.
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neys' fees to plaintiffs when the defendants have litigated in bad
faith.' 20 Moreover, it is already well recognized that certain defendants
may not use every available strategy or technique in negotiation and
litigation in order to avoid liability. Insurance companies' 2 ' and fidu-
ciaries' 22 may be held liable for breaching their duty of good faith
23
120. See supra notes 44-47 & accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 59-63 & accompanying text.
122. The adversary model of litigation has not gained full acceptance in the area of
fiduciary litigation. A trustee does not have the right to "slam the door" on a beneficiary
and deny performance of fiduciary obligations until presented with a court order. This
means the trustee must, among other things, maintain adequate records, 2 A. ScoTT, ScoTT
ON TRUSTS § 172 (3d ed. 1967), make periodic accountings, id, and provide information
upon the reasonable request by the beneficiary. Id. § 173. In other words, there is an obli-
gation to provide free discovery.
The performance of obligations under fiduciary principles has been applied to others as
well. Executors, In re Denman Estate, 94 Cal. App. 3d 289, 156 Cal. Rptr. 341 (1979);
Morris v. Mull, 110 Ohio St. 623, 144 N.E. 436 (1924); Estate of Van Epps, 40 Wis. 2d 139,
161 N.W.2d 278 (1968), administrators, Harper v. Betts, 177 Ark. 977, 8 S.W.2d 464 (1928);
In re Burke's Estate, 198 Cal. 163, 244 P. 340 (1926); Kaufman v. Kaufman,292 Ky. 351, 166
S.E.2d 860 (1942), joint venturers, Sime v. Malouf, 95 Cal. App. 2d 82, 97, 212 P.2d 946, 955
(1949); Eubank v. Richardson, 353 S.W.2d 367 (Ky. 1962); Hayes v. Muller, 245 La. 356, 158
So. 2d 191 (1963), and partners, Lanx v. Freed, 53 Cal. 2d 512, 348 P.2d 873, 2 Cal. Rptr. 265
(1960); Prince v. Sonnesyn, 222 Minn. 528, 25 N.W.2d 468 (1946); Van Hooser v. Keenon,
271 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. 1954); Hsu Ying Li v. Tang, 87 Wash. 2d 796, 557 P.2d 342 (1976), are
also governed by fiduciary principles. This greatly influences the nature of the relationship.
A duty to cooperate, for example, in the resolution of joint venture and partnership transac-
tions is implicit in the fiduciary duty not to take unfair advantage of the other party. Nelson
v. Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 751, 177 P.2d 931, 934 (1947). Fiduciary obligations are contin-
uing obligations. The fact that persons disagree or even resort to litigation does not relieve
the fiduciary from performance of the requisite duties. Sime v. Malouf, 95 Cal. App. 2d 82,
97, 212 P.2d 946, 955 (1949). As a consequence, fiduciary litigation does not proceed on a
strictly adversarial basis. But ef Gray v. Don Miller & Assocs., Inc., 35 Cal. 3d 498, 674
P.2d 253, 198 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1984) (court declined to adopt a fiduciary exception to the
American rule on attorneys' fees).
123. The principles developed in the insurance cases have potential for greater applica-
bility because of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing which is implied in every con-
tract. See Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158,
206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984); Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328
P.2d 198, 200 (1958); Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 771,
128 P.2d 665, 677 (1942); Milstein v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 27 Cal. App. 3d 482, 486, 103
Cal. Rptr. 16, 18 (1972); see also U.C.C. § 1-203 (1982). The nature of the covenant was
stated by the California Supreme Court in Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg.
Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 771, 128 P.2d 665, 677 (1942):
In every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do anything
which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to
receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every contract there exists an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The covenant has usually been applied in the insurance context, see, e.g., Crisci v. Security
Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (1967), or the fiduciary
context, see, e.g., Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 771, 128
P.2d 665, 677 (1942) (joint venture); Nelson v. Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 750-51, 177 P.2d
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during the negotiation, settlement, or litigation of valid claims.
As early as 1897, in Kolka v. Jones,124 one court considered and
accepted the principle that though malicious defense had not yet been
recognized in the law, such a remedy would be appropriate under the
right circumstances:
It is not safe to infer that because no one has thought of seeking
indemnity for the injury he has sustained by reason of the interposi-
tion, by the defendant from unjustifiable motives, of a false defense
or a spurious counterclaim, therefore no remedy will in such a case
be allowed by the law. On the contrary, we are strongly of the opin-
ion that, if a defendant should force upon the plaintiff the litigation
of an alleged counterclaim known by defendant to be without foun-
dation, he would be liable for the damages caused thereby,-the lia-
bility to be enforced in a suit in the nature of an action for malicious
prosecution. 125
The case in favor of recognizing malicious defense is thus based
upon considerations of circumstance and principle. The plaintiff is
faced with the unenviable choices of settling for less than what is right-
fully due or foregoing the use of that lesser amount in order to pursue
collection of the full amount, albeit after paying attorneys' fees and
waiting several years. The action for malicious defense is also needed
to protect the integrity of the judicial process, to deal with dishonest
and unethical behavior, and to discourage misuse and abuse of limited
judicial resources. The action is also well within precepts and princi-
ples already well established in the law. It is necessary, however, to
analyze these considerations in some detail in order to construct the
elements of the tort as well as the necessary restrictions on its
applicability.
The Elements of the Malicious Defense Tort
A cause of action for malicious defense would apply the principles
of the established tort of malicious prosecution. It would allow appli-
cation of similar rules and precepts to the defendant's side of the adver-
sarial ledger. Some distinctions calling for differences in application
931, 934 (1947) (partnership). Recent California cases, however, have extended its applica-
tion to wrongful termination of employment cases. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal.
App. 3d 311, 327-28, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925-26 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Il1
Cal. App. 3d 443, 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728 (1980); Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d
27, 33, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 520 (1980). See generally Diamond, supra note 64; Louderback &
Jurika, supra note 64; Miller and Estes, Recent JudicialLimitations on the Right to Discharge:
.4 Caifornia Trilogy, 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 65 (1982).
124. 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897).
125. Id. at 469-70, 71 N.W. at 561 (dictum).
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will be required, but the framework for the analysis of the malicious
defense tort is already in place.
The elements of a cause of action for malicious prosecution have
been summarized as follows:
(1) the initiation, continuation, or procurement of a judicial, ad-
ministrative or disciplinary proceeding;
(2) by or at the insistence of the defendant as the plaintiff or initi-
ating party in the previous proceedings;
(3) favorable termination of the previous proceedings;
(4) lack of probable cause;
(5) malice; and
(6) injuries or damages sustained. 126
These elements will serve as the model for discussion of the elements of
malicious defense.
Initiation, Continuation or Procurement of Proceedings
"Initiation" means to set the machinery of the law in motion to
enforce a claim or counterclaim. 127 In malicious prosecution, the filing
of an action or the filing of a cross-complaint or counterclaim will sat-
isfy this element.128 The rule also applies to procuring the initiation of
proceedings or to continuing a proceeding 129 properly begun. 130
Although the malicious defendant does not in the superficial sense
126. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674 (1979) sets forth the elements as follows:
One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation or procurement of civil
proceedings against another is subject to liability to the other for wrongful civil
proceedings if
(a) he acts without probable cause, and primarily for a purpose other than that of
securing the proper adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are
based, and,
(b) except where they are ex parte, the proceedings have terminated in favor of the
person against whom they are brought.
See also Mills County State Bank v. Roure, 291 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1980); Ellman v. Mc-
Carty, 70 A.D.2d 150, 420 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1972); PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 1,
at 1099; PROSSER, supra note I, at 853-56. It should be noted that the specific elements
required may depend upon the extent to which a jurisdiction recognizes malicious prosecu-
tion in the absence of special injury. See supra note 1.
127. RESTATEMENT, supra note I, § 674 comment a.
128. Id. See also Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 184 (1975); Slee v. Simpson, 91 Colo. 461, 15 P.2d 1084 (1932).
129. Initiation of a "proceeding" can include administrative proceedings, see RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 1, § 680, and disciplinary or disbarment proceedings. See Donovan v.
Barnes, 274 Or. 701, 548 P.2d 980 (1976) (student disciplinary proceedings); Kaufman v. A.
H. Robins Co., 223 Tenn. 515, 448 S.W.2d 400 (1969) (state board of pharmacy proceed-
ings); Lackey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 30 Tenn. App. 390, 206 S.W.2d 806 (1947) (dis-
barment proceeding). But see Stone v. Rosen, 348 So. 2d 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)
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"initiate" the action, his role in the litigation is not less culpable than
the malicious plaintifis. The action is usually precipitated by the de-
fendant's unjustified refusal to pay a just obligation. The action is con-
tinued at the discretion of the defendant who employs one or more of
the standard defensive tactics: A general or specific denial of the alle-
gations of the complaint; the filing of a counterclaim or cross-com-
plaint; the assertion of false defenses which raise questions of fact and
are designed to defeat a motion for summary judgment;13 1 the filing of
motions for the purpose of delay; 132 and failure to cooperate in the dis-
covery process through repeated objections to interrogatories, refusals
to answer questions at depositions, perjured testimony, and destruction
of records. 133 The use of any of these tactics should satisfy the require-
(complaint initiating disbarment proceeding is absolutely privileged as against a malicious
prosecution lawsuit).
130. Security Underground Storage, Inc. v. Anderson, 347 F.2d 964 (10th Cir. 1965)
(defendant, while acting as plaintiff's attorney, assisted another in maliciously bringing suit
against plaintiff); Laney v. Glidden Co., 239 Ala. 396, 194 So. 849 (1940) (defendants, after
being informed of a mistake in the naming of parties to the prior suit, continued the action
maliciously and without probable cause); RESTATEMENT, supranote I, § 674 comments b, c.
131. The purpose of summary judgment is to alleviate the need for trial on factual issues
when there is no legitimate dispute. As Justice Cardozo wrote: "The very object of a motion
for summary judgment is to separate what is formal or pretended in denial or averment from
what is genuine or substantial, so that only the latter may subject a suitor to the burden of a
trial." Richard v. Credit Suisse, 242 N.Y. 346, 350, 152 N.E. 110, 111 (1926). Thus, it would
appear that summary judgment will be useful to the plaintiff confronted with a bad faith
defense. As one court stated:
The defendant must show that he has a bona fide defense to the action, one which
he may be able to establish. It must be a plausible ground of defense, something
fairly arguable and of a substantial character. This he must show by affidavits or
other proof. He cannot shelter himself behind general or specific denials, or deni-
als of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief. He must show that his
denial or his defense is not false and sham, but interposed in good faith and not for
delay.
Dwan v. Massarene, 199 A.D. 872, 880, 192 N.Y.S. 577, 582-83 (1922). There is a problem,
however, when the defendant creates the appearance of a triable issue of fact by lying. By
denying what the defendant knows to be true or by creating an affirmative defense through a
perjured answer or affidavit, the defendant may be able to survive a summary judgment
motion and thereby continue the bad faith defense through the trial.
132. See Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motion Practice.- Time for Change, 44 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 1069 (1976).
133. See Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal
Problems and,4buses, 1980 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 787, 824-59.
[I]t would be difficult to exaggerate the pervasiveness of evasive practices or their
adverse impact on the efficiency and effectiveness (for information distribution) of
civil discovery. Evasion infects every kind of litigation and frustrates lawyers in
every kind of practice. With the possible exception of the role of the courts, no
aspect of the discovery process stands in greater need of extensive critical scrutiny
.... The term "evasion" also refers to more direct forms of resistance to disclo-
sure, for example, refusing to respond in any way to discovery probes or intention-
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ment of an "action" by the defendant, taken without a credible basis.
By or at the Insistence of the Defendant
The requirement that the proceedings be initiated, continued, or
procured by the defendant is straightforward. It requires a factual de-
termination of the responsibility for the malicious action. In this re-
gard, the role of the attorney becomes important. In malicious
prosecution, the question may arise whether the plaintiff who filed the
groundless lawsuit may have a defense based upon advice of coun-
sel.' 34 The attorney's liability for initiating baseless and malicious liti-
gation is more difficult to establish.
An attorney is not liable for initiating a wrongful civil action if he
had probable cause for filing the action.13 5 Furthermore, even if the
attorney knew there was no probable cause, there is no liability in the
absence of malice.136 An attorney is not required to prejudge the valid-
ity of the client's claim and may rely on statements and information
provided by the client.' 37 If, however, the attorney knows the action is
unfounded and files it for an improper purpose, such as harassment of
the innocent party, then the attorney may be held liable along with the
client. 138 This allows the attorney to maintain the role of counselor and
ally withholding some evidence that is clearly sought and discoverable (both
variations on the "stonewalling" theme). The words of one perhaps atypically cyn-
ical or at least blunt lawyer capture the spirit of the problem: "The purpose of
discovery," he declared, "is to give as little as possible so [your opponents] will
have to come back and back and maybe will go away or give up."
Id. at 829.
134. The issue of the client's responsibility for acting on advice of counsel is best treated
under the element of probable cause. See infra text accompanying notes 146-54.
135. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 674 comment d. See also id. § 675. See, e.g., Bird v.
Rothman, 128 Ariz. 599, 602, 627 P.2d 1097, 1101 (1981); Central Florida Mach. Co. v.
Williams, 400 So. 2d 30, 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Wong v. Tabor, 422 N.E.2d 1279,
1285-89 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Junot v. Lee, 372 So. 2d 707, 710 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Perry v.
Sulier, 92 Mich. 72, 75, 52 N.W. 801, 801 (1892); Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 241-
42, 28 N.W.2d 780, 792 (1947); Kallman v. Burke, 47 A.D.2d 515, 516, 363 N.Y.S.2d 588,
589 (1975).
136. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 674 comment d. See, e.g., Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill.
App. 3d 940, 948-49, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1372-73 (1978); Kallman v. Burke, 47 A.D.2d 515,
516, 363 N.Y.S.2d 588, 589 (1975).
137. Maechtlen v. Clapp, 121 Kan. 777, 781, 250 P. 303, 304 (1926); Peck v. Chouteau,
91 Mo. 138, 151-52, 3 S.W. 577, 581 (1887). Normally, the remedy for bringing an un-
founded action on behalf of a client will be a disciplinary proceeding with the bar, not a
private cause of action for damages. See Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 111. App. 3d 815, 823, 372
N.E.2d 685, 691 (1978); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 907-08 (Iowa 1978). Cf MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-26 (1979).
138. See, e.g., Munson v. Linick, 255 Cal. App. 2d 589, 63 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1967); First
Nat'l Bank v. Gardner, 376 S.W.2d 311 (Ky. 1964); Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28
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advocate; when the attorney becomes an active participant in the
wrongful proceeding, then liability should attach.
In the event of malicious defense, the attorney should have the
same protection and the same exposure. The lawyer may advise the
defendant concerning the defensive tactics available. The lawyer must
not be put in the position of adjudicating the client's case. However, as
in the case of advising a plaintiff of the potential liability for prosecut-
ing a malicious action, the attorney should advise the defendant of pos-
sible liability for interposing a malicious defense. When the lawyer
goes beyond the role of counselor and intentionally initiates defensive
action that harasses the plaintiff and that the attorney knows or should
know is without a credible basis, then the attorney, no less than the
client, should be liable.
Favorable Termination of the Prior Proceeding
The favorable termination element in malicious prosecution may
be satisfied in one of three ways: (1) a decision favorable to defendant
by the court or competent tribunal; (2) withdrawal of the proceedings
by the person who initiated them; or (3) dismissal of the proceeding
because of the failure to prosecute. 139 Final disposition of any appeal
is necessary to satisfy the termination requirement. 14° Termination of
an action by compromise or settlement is not sufficient to support a
malicious prosecution action. 14'
Despite arguments that a defendant should be allowed to counter-
claim for malicious prosecution in the main proceeding,142 most juris-
N.W.2d 780 (1949). This liability includes situations where the civil proceeding is continued
without probable cause and for an improper purpose. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 674
comment d.
139. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 674 comment i.
140. Id. See Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 295 P.2d 405 (1956) (malicious prose-
cution action not premature because time for appeal of portion of judgment denying lien on
plaintiff's property had run out even though the action was filed while an appeal from an-
other portion of the judgment was still pending). Cf. Merron v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 27
Cal. App. 2d 119, 121, 80 P.2d 740, 742 (1938) (the statute of limitations does not commence
running until the judgment becomes final on appeal).
141. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 854.
142. See Note, Malicious Prosecution: An Effective Attack on Spurious Medical Malprac-
tice Claims?, 26 CASE W. REs. 653, 684 (1976); Note, supra note 1, at 1232-37. The State of
Washington enacted a statute in 1977 which allows a counterclaim for malicious prosecu-
tion. The statute provides, "In any action for damages, whether based on tort or contract or
otherwise, a claim or counterclaim for damages may be litigated in the principal action for
malicious prosecution . . . ." WASH. Rv. CODE § 4.24.350 (Supp. 1977). For a critical
analysis of the statute, see Note, Malicious Prosecution Counterclaims Now Available in the
Principal Action-Implicit Abandonment of the Doctrine of Strict Limitation-Wash. Rev.
Code § 4.24.350 (Supp. 1977), 53 WASH. L. REv. 805 (1978).
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dictions have retained the favorable termination requirement. 143 The
principal reasons for maintaining the requirement are to avoid incon-
sistent verdicts' 44 and to avoid prejudice to the plaintiff's case by the
introduction of evidence of plaintiffs intent.1 45 The requirement also
keeps the issues in the lawsuit clear. Although the favorable termina-
tion requirement potentially increases the number of lawsuits, a de-
fendant actually may be less likely to make the claim after the passion
of the lawsuit has subsided.
An action for malicious defense should also require a favorable
termination of the prior action. To allow an action for malicious de-
fense in the main action would unduly complicate the issues. It might
also prejudice the defendant's case and possibly create serious conflicts
of interest during the litigation between the defendant and his attorney.
There is the additional possibility that a plaintiff would otherwise as a
matter of course include a count in the complaint for malicious
defense.
One serious problem arises in applying the favorable termination
rule in the context of malicious defense. It appears that in the case of a
settlement, the rule would allow certain malicious defendants to avoid
the restraints of the tort. If an action for malicious defense is not per-
mitted in the event the lawsuit is settled, the malicious defendant can
make an unjust settlement with impunity. On the other hand, to treat
the settlement and release of all claims as not binding on the plaintiff
for malicious defense purposes would create more problems than it
would solve. If the release is not binding, the courts would be further
burdened by those who felt they did not get as favorable a settlement as
143. See Babb v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 841, 847, 479 P.2d 379, 382, 92 Cal Rptr. 179,
182 (1971) (lower court erred in attempting to proceed with cross-complaint filed before the
original action had terminated); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 947, 381 N.E.2d 1367,
1372 (1978) (no action could lie in the absence of a favorable termination of the original
proceeding); see also Birnbaum, Physicians Counterattack: Liability of Lawyersfrom Institut-
ing Unjust#Fed Medical Malpractice Actions, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003, 1026 (1977); Reuter,
supra note 76, at 206-07.
144. The requirement of favorable termination eliminates the possibility that the de-
fendant could lose the main proceeding and yet win the malicious prosecution action. Babb
v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 841, 847, 479 P.2d 379, 382, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 182 (1971).
145. Id. See Birnbaum, supra note 143, at 1027:
Moreover, if counterclaims for malicious prosecution were permitted to be asserted
in the original action, a plaintiff could suffer substantial prejudice by the introduc-
tion of proof of lack of probable cause and malice in the original proceeding. Fi-
nally, if an attorney was joined as a defendant in the malicious prosecution action
before the termination of the original proceeding, the attorney would be placed in
a potentially adverse position to his client and separate counsel would have to be
retained at additional expense to the plaintiff to prosecute the original action.
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they had wished. If malicious defense is recognized, however, the
value of the plaintiff's forebearance to sue will be reflected in an in-
creased settlement offer. Thus, though a particular plaintiff may not
receive an adequate settlement, settlements in general should be in-
creased overall.
Lack of Probable Cause
Probable cause to defeat a malicious prosecution claim is supplied
by the reasonable belief that the action brought had a reasonable
chance of succeeding before a judge or jury. Thus, probable cause is an
objective test.' 46 The plaintiff s belief must have some basis in fact, and
its support in law or equity must be honestly debatable. 147 Advice of
counsel that there is a reasonable chance the claim will be upheld is
usually enough to establish probable cause.148 If the advice is given by
an attorney who is personally interested in the outcome of the case,
however, the reasonableness of the plaintiff's reliance may be ques-
tioned. 149 Probable cause is also satisfied if the plaintiff obtains a
146. See, e.g., Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630, 638 (S.D. Ohio 1973);
Masterson v. Pig'n Whistle Corp., 161 Cal. App. 2d 323, 335, 326 P.2d 918, 926 (1958).
147. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 675; PROSSER, supra note 1, at 854. The Restate-
ment sets out the test for probable cause as a reasonable belief in the existence of facts upon
which a claim is based, and either a reasonable belief that applicable law will support a
claim under these facts, or a reasonable belief in the same in reliance upon advice of coun-
sel, sought in good faith, and with full disclosure of the relevant facts. RESTATEMENT, supra
note I, § 675.
148. RESTATEMENT, supra note I, § 675. See Brinkley v. Appleby, 276 Cal. App. 2d 244,
80 Cal. Rptr. 734, 736 (1969); Terminal Grain Corp. v. Freeman, 270 N.W.2d 806, 809 (S.D.
1978).
149. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 675 comment h:
Civil proceedings are not infrequently brought by an attorney who is personally
interested in the outcome of the case because of a contingent-fee arrangement.
Although the interest of the attorney in his fee in the case is merely that of any
lawyer in being paid for his services and does not make his motive in bringing the
action an improper one (see § 674, Comment d), the fact that his fee will depend
upon the bringing of the action is a factor to be considered in determining whether
the client reasonably believes that his advice is disinterested. If the contingent-fee
arrangement is made before the facts are submitted to him or if he has solicited the
case and the contingent fee, the circumstances may indicate to a reasonable man in
the client's position that he is dealing with one whose advice is not disinterested
and so cannot reasonably be trusted. On the other hand, they may still indicate the
honesty and disinterested character of the advice. The question is one of fact, but
since it is one of probable cause it is to be determined by the court rather than the
jury. (See § 68 IB). When, however, the initiative is taken by the client and he
consults the attorney without prearrangement for the fee, the fact that after the
advice is given the case is entrusted to the attorney on a contingent basis, is no
indication that the advice is not disinterested.
See Munson v. Linnick, 255 Cal. App. 2d 589, 63 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1967). Cf. Tool Research
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favorable judgment in the action, unless obtained by fraud, even
though the judgment is later reversed on appeal.' 50
The cause of action for malicious defense should use the same ob-
jective standard for probable cause. If the defendant believes that the
denial or defense has some basis in fact and that, if proven, such denial
or defense is supported by legal or equitable argument, and such belief
is objectively reasonable, then probable cause exists for the defendant's
action. The assertion of bona fide defenses must be protected, even if
the defendant is mistaken in his judgment. Such a "margin of
safety"'151 is necessary in the litigation of disputes. Thus, a legitimate
dispute as to the existence or amount of the claim implies probable
cause for the defensive actions. 152
Such protection should be denied for those defendants who lie.153
If the defendant files a verified answer to a complaint denying what the
defendant knows to be true, or asserts a defense that the defendant
knows or should know has no credible basis, or attempts to make the
plaintiff's task of proving the claim more difficult by lying or destroying
records in the pre-trial stages, then lack of probable cause has been
established. Also, if the defendant has within his or her means the abil-
ity to ascertain the validity and amount of plaintiff's claim, then lack of
knowledge will not constitute probable cause.154 The advice of defense
counsel will protect the defendant who cannot be expected to know the
legal sufficiency of certain defenses, but will not protect the defendant
who intentionally lies or fails to disclose relevant facts to the attorney.
& Eng'g Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 685, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291,298 (1975) (the fact
that counsel received a $50,000 fee in connection with the prior action was not sufficient to
show improper motive absent proof that the fee was not reasonable).
150. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 855.
151. Melvin v. Pence, 130 F.2d 423, 426 (D.C. Cir.1942).
152. A defendant may have probable cause to question the amount of the plaintiffs
claim even though there is no probable cause to deny liability altogether. The wrongful
denial of liability should give rise to an action for malicious defense to the extent that dam-
ages relating to the wrongful denial, not to the valid questioning of the amount, can be
ascertained. These cases will often occur in the personal injury area, where the liability of
the defendant is beyond dispute, but where the amount of damages is subject to a reasonable
difference of opinion.
153. Cf. Hazard, The Lawyer's Obligation To Be Trustworthy When Dealing With Oppos-
ing Parties, 33 S.C.L. REV. 181 (1981); Lawry, Lying, Confidentiality, and the Adversary
System of Justice, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 653, 657-62; White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical
Limitations on Lying in Negotiations, 1980 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 926.
154. Cf. Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954) (corporation president's
defense that he had no knowledge as to the sufficiency of shareholders' request for a special
meeting was frivolous because the corporation had a shareholders list and could determine
whether a sufficient number of shareholders had signed the request).
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Malice
In contrast to probable cause, which is an objective measure of the
reasonableness of a plaintiff's likelihood of success, malice measures
the subjective aspect of plaintiff's intent. The element of malice has
been variously defined as ill will, 55 lack of belief in any possible suc-
cess or reckless disregard of the propriety of the action,156 or an ulterior
purpose other than securing a proper adjudication of the claim.157 The
Restatement commentary lists a number of situations in which malice
may be shown. 58 In the most common instance, a plaintiff brings a
civil proceeding, knowing the proceeding is not meritorious. A good
faith effort for modification or reversal of existing law, however, is not
malicious.'5 9 Although malice is a subjective evaluation, it may be im-
plied from the lack of probable cause.' 60 Conversely, if probable cause
exists, the motive for bringing the action is irrelevant.' 6' When pro-
ceedings are commenced to deprive a person of the beneficial use of
property, malice may be shown. Filing a lis pendens notice to cloud
155. See Griswold v. Home, 19 Ariz. 56,70, 165 P. 318, 323 (1917) (evil motive); South-
western Ry. Co. v. Mitchell, 80 Ga. 438, 442, 5 S.E. 490, 491 (1888) ("any act willfully and
purposely to the prejudice and injury of another, which is unlawful, is against that person,
malicious"); Park v. Security Bank & Trust Co., 512 P.2d 113, 119 (Okla. 1973) ("ill will or
hatred"); Yelk v. Seefeldt, 35 Wis. 2d 271, 278, 151 N.W.2d 4, 8 (1967) ("hostile or vindictive
motive").
156. See Robinson v. Goudchaux's, 309 So. 2d 287, 290 (La. 1975) ("where there is a
want of probable cause resulting from wanton and reckless disregard of the rights of the
party sued, evincing utter absence of that caution and inquiry a man should employ before
filing suit on any account against his customer, malice will be inferred"); Nyer v. Carter, 367
A.2d 1375, 1378 (Me. 1977) ("malice may be inferred from gross and culpable negligence in
omitting to make suitable inquiries before instituting the suit"); Hugee v. Pennsylvania Ry.
Co., 376 Pa. 286, 291, 101 A.2d 740, 743 (1954) (malice "may consist of defendant's reckless
and oppressive disregard of plaintiff's rights").
157. See Suchey v. Stiles, 155 Colo. 363, 366, 394 P.2d 739, 741 (1964) (malice "is any
motive other than a desire to bring an offender to justice"); Yelk v. Seefeldt, 35 Wis. 2d 271,
278, 151 N.W.2d 4, 8 (1967) ("primary purpose was other than the social one of having a
determination of the state of plaintiff's mental health"); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 676.
158. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 676 comment c. For a general discussion of the
malice requirement, see Fridman, Malice in the Law of Torts, 21 MOD. L. REv. 484 (1958).
159. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1
(1983). For example, it was not malicious for the plaintiff in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.
3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) to seek a reversal of the long standing rule
barring all recovery for a tort claim to a contributorily negligent plaintiff.
160. Stewart v. Sonnebom, 98 U.S. 187, 193 (1878); Cole v. Neaf, 334 F.2d 326, 329 (8th
Cir. 1964); Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Mitchell, 80 Ga. 438, 442, 5 S.E. 490, 491 (1888);
Thompson v. General Fin. Co., 205 Kan. 76, 468 P.2d 269, 286 (1970); Crouter v. United
Adjusters, Inc., 266 Or. 6, 9-10, 510 P.2d 1328, 1330 (1973); Nagy v. McBurney, 120 R.I. 925,
929-30, 392 A.2d 365, 367 (1978).
161. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 676 comment a. See generally Nelson v. Miller, 227
Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980); Yelk v. Seefeldt, 35 Wis. 2d 271, 151 N.W.2d 4 (1967).
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title to real property is an example. 162 Finally, malice may be shown by
the filing of a groundless counterclaim or cross-complaint for the pur-
pose of applying more pressure on the plaintiff in litigation.163
In malicious defense, malice will be shown by the defendant's in-
tentional disregard of the plaintiff's claim through a deliberate denial
or an assertion of spurious defenses and objections which the defendant
knows, or should know, lack any merit. Malice may be implied from
the lack of probable cause or from the refusal to comply with clear
legal obligations. In the latter instance, malice should be implied if a
defendant refuses to comply with a clearly recognized duty, for exam-
ple, to render a partnership accounting or to preserve partnership
books and records.' 64
Injury or Damages as a Result of the Previous Proceedings
Unless damages are in the nature of defamation, such as the filing
of an involuntary bankruptcy, or insanity or paternity proceedings, the
plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action must prove actual dam-
ages.' 65 Damages will include the loss from the dispossession or inter-
ference with the use of property, damages to reputation, expenses
incurred in connection with the litigation, specific pecuniary losses re-
sulting from the proceedings, and emotional distress caused by the pro-
ceedings. 66 Punitive damages are also potentially recoverable. 167
The damages caused by a malicious defendant are much the same.
The plaintiff must incur the added expense of hiring an attorney to
negotiate the claim, bring the action, take the discovery, prepare for
trial, and try the case, if the defendant chooses to hold out.168 In many
162. Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 382, 295 P.2d 405, 411 (1956).
163. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Elgin Coal, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 17 (E.D. Tenn.
1972); Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184
(1975); Slee v. Simpson, 91 Colo. 461, 15 P.2d 1084 (1932).
164. See Wilson v. Moline, 229 Minn. 164, 38 N.W.2d 201 (1949); Few v. Few, 239 S.C.
321, 122 S.E.2d 829 (1961); Simich v. Culjack, 27 Wash. 2d 403, 178 P.2d 336 (1947).
165. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 855.
166. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 681. See Boland v. Ballaine, 266 F. 22 (9th Cir.
1920) (actual damages from loss of sale due to cloud on title of property); Weismann v.
Middleton, 390 A.2d 996 (D.C. 1978) (attorney's fees and compensatory damages); Rich v.
Rogers, 250 Mass. 587, 146 N.E. 246 (1925) (any financial loss resulting directly from the
prosecution); Koch v. Segler, 331 S.W.2d 126 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960) (mental anxiety and suf-
fering); Annot., 37 A.L.R. 656 (1925) (injury to reputation).
167. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 681A(f). See Wasman v. Middleton, 390 A.2d 996,
999 (D.C. 1978); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Ensley, 148 Ind. App. 151, 152, 264 N.E.2d 80,
81 (1970); Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 282-83, 607 P.2d 438, 447 (1980).
168. See supra notes 9, 27; Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Fees for Abuses of the Judicial
System, 61 N.C.L. REV. 613, 616 (1983).
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instances, the major portion is the damage to the financial standing of
the person or business. It takes a persistent plaintiff to forego the use of
a portion of the claim in order to recover the full amount rightfully
due. 169 The damage to a business would include lost profits and addi-
tional expenses incurred in financing the business due to the failure of
the defendant to pay the money owed. Emotional distress, no less real
for the innocent plaintiff than for the innocent defendant, is not easily
susceptible of proof. Recovery of compensatory damages should in
most cases be limited to monetary losses, except when proof of emo-
tional distress is convincing. Evidence of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress or other oppressive conduct may also be relevant in
arguing for punitive damages. 70 As in malicious prosecution, the in-
jured party must bear the burden of proof on these elements. 17' The
burden of proof ensures that the action does not deter the good faith
assertion of claims. If the plaintiff in a malicious defense action can
meet this burden, no policy reason bars a recovery.
Summary of Elements of the New Tort
The foregoing analysis indicates that the elements of the malicious
defense tort can parallel those of the established tort of malicious pros-
ecution. Use of the elements of malicious prosecution as a guide would
minimize the hazards of the expansion of tort law into a new area. De-
velopment would be guided by the experience of courts, which have
dealt with the problems of malice, probable cause, favorable termina-
tion, and damages for over one hundred years. The elements of the
malicious defense tort would accordingly track the elements of mali-
cious prosecution as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts172
and would be as follows:
One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation, or pro-
curement of the defense of a civil proceeding is subject to liability for
all harm proximately caused, including reasonable attorneys' fees, if
(a) he or she acts without probable cause, te., without any credible
basis in fact and such action is not warranted by existing law or es-
tablished equitable principles or a good faith argument for the exten-
sion, modification, or reversal of existing law,
(b) with knowledge or notice of the lack of merit in such actions,
169. See supra note 28.
170. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 404, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78, 95-96 (1970).
171. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 681A. See, e.g., Ford Ins. & Real Estate Co. v.
Thrasher, 45 Ala. App. 592, 595, 234 So. 2d 590, 592 (1970); McGranahan v. Dahar, 119
N.H. 758, 769, 408 A.2d 121, 128 (1979).
172. See supra note 126.
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(c) primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the proper
adjudication of the claim and defense thereto, such as to harass, an-
noy or injure, or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation,
(d) the previous proceedings are terminated in favor of the party
bringing the malicious defense action, and
(e) injury or damage is sustained.
To allay fears that the action might discourage honest or meritori-
ous defenses, the plaintiff would be required to bear the burden of
proof on the elements. Access to courts for the resolution of legitimate
disputes must not be hindered. Nevertheless, the benefits of dispute res-
olution through the adversarial process must not obscure recognition of
the significant damage to both the judicial system and the innocent par-
ties which can result from malicious assertion of false and baseless
defenses.
Application of the Elements
The elements of the tort of malicious defense provide guidance for
courts in resolving disputes involving allegations of malicious defense.
A line must be drawn between the vigorous and good faith assertion of
defenses that may turn out to be wrong and the malicious and baseless
assertion of defenses which are clearly wrong. Though drawing the line
may be difficult, it is here that the analytical tools of malicious prosecu-
tion are particularly useful. The focus of inquiry must be probable
cause and malice. From the attorney's standpoint, one should ask: "Is
there any legitimate basis to support what my client and I would like to
do in defending this case?"
To avoid liability for malicious defense, a defendant must have
probable cause to believe the tendered defense is legitimate. Probable
cause must exist to defend on each issue, not just some probable cause
to defend generally. To use an example from one of the hypotheticals
at the beginning of this Article,173 the partner who decides to conduct a
vigorous defense in the partnership accounting case must have prob-
able cause to defend on each issue on which he chooses to enter a de-
nial. If, for example, twenty items in the accounting are not
legitimately in dispute and five items are, the defendant may not deny
the legitimacy of all twenty-five items. He must admit those items that
are not legitimately in dispute and may defend on those items for
which probable cause exists to disagree with the plaintiff. Similarly, if
a plaintiff says that the defendant owes $100,000 and the defendant
173. See supra note 35 & accompanying text.
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knows he or she owes at least $85,000, the defendant may not deny
owing the entire amount, but may only litigate as to the disputed
$15,000.
In addition to probable cause, the element of malice will be useful
in drawing the line between a vigorous defense and a malicious de-
fense. The defense tendered in good faith, without intent to harm or to
injure the plaintiff, will not be a malicious defense. The element of
malice helps to focus on the motive guiding the decision to defend. If
the husband in the divorce example 74 seeks to injure the wife or to
successfully litigate support, custody, and property issues by wearing
her down financially and emotionally with his delaying tactics, then
malice is present. It is important to remember, particularly in the di-
vorce context, that malice alone will not be actionable. It is malice
coupled with lack of probable cause which distinguishes the malicious
defense from the vigorous defense.
The analytical tools of probable cause and malice should guide a
court in assessing whether a defense has been vigorous or malicious.
The judicial process of drawing the line between the vigorous and the
malicious may have an inhibiting effect on the assertion of at least
some meritorious defenses. The benefit of the assertion of such de-
fenses, however, must be weighed against the burdens imposed by per-
mitting assertion of all possible defenses, including those which are
malicious and without credible basis. Thus viewed, the benefits of un-
restricted defense advocacy pale in the light of the injustice to the par-
ties, the cost and delay to all litigants, and the burden imposed on the
court system.
Conclusion
The function of the courts is to facilitate the resolution of disputes,
if possible by settlement, or, failing that, by adjudicating them justly.
By failing to condemn malicious defenses, the courts acquiesce in the
use of their processes for purposes wholly unrelated to their function.
Legal procedure should not be manipulated solely to achieve some col-
lateral purpose. 75 If a legitimate dispute exists, the fact that some col-
lateral purpose may also be served is nevertheless justified by the
courts' discharge of their primary dispute-resolving function. If no col-
orably legitimate dispute exists, however, the use of the court processes
174. See supra note 37 & accompanying text.
175. Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 404, 343
N.E.2d 278, 283, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 643 (1975).
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for collateral advantage or to avenge some personal affront serves no
legitimate purpose. "There is no public policy in favor of an attempt to
coerce settlement of a non-existent dispute by outrageous means."' 76
The unarticulated reluctance of the judicial system to recognize a
tort of malicious defense remains. This reluctance may stem from the
practices, conditions, and circumstances of the times in which the desir-
ability of recognizing the tort of malicious prosecution was being de-
bated. With a few exceptions, malicious defense was mentioned only
tangentially in the arguments. The cases, however devoid of express
statement of the reasons, nevertheless make clear the judicial disfavor
of a malicious defense tort. But practices, conditions, and circum-
stances have changed.
The justification of uninhibited litigation on grounds of open ac-
cess to the courts and court processes has proven to be a significant
cause of court congestion. The overtaxing of judicial resources, caused
in part by unfettered advocacy, has resulted in restricted access for al
litigants. Moreover, the rejection of an action for malicous defense
means that no wrongful defense, however baseless, malicious, or fraud-
ulent, is actionable. The law is thus confirmed as a game in which
anything goes. Cynicism and mistrust of the legal profession are the
natural consequences.
A tort of malicious defense of a civil action should now be recog-
nized. Assertion of a defense, which the defendant knows or should
know is without credible basis, for the purpose of delay and the advan-
tages that may go with it should be actionable. Under such circum-
stances, culpability and injury are clear. There is no longer any
justification for tolerating this wrong without a remedy. 177 Civil litiga-
tion has become too slow, too time-consuming, and too expensive.
A malicious defense tort is well within established precepts and
principles. The framework for its controlled development is already in
place. It is now clear that the law is responding to criticism from within
and without the profession by limiting the abuses of excessive advo-
cacy. Public confidence and the integrity of the legal system are at
stake. Limits are necessary; the law should no longer tolerate by acqui-
escence what is plainly wrong. A tort of malicious defense in civil liti-
gation should be recognized.
176. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 396, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78,
89-90 (1970).
177. As one court commented as early as 1897, "the continued denial of a remedy for
what was once not a serious, but which has finally become a grievous, wrong, can no longer
be maintained." Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 469, 71 N.W. 558, 561 (1897).
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